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I. INTRODUCTION

The dividing line between contract and tort law has always been a
difficult one to draw. The sale of a product generally involves two broad
concerns. One concern is a private one that contracting parties can
agree on the terms of a private sale within defined Li:rnits. The second
concern is a public concern that the product sold not cause any injury or
damage. The economic loss doctrine follows tl1is public/private line of
demarcation. The doctrine draws the line between contract and tort
based on the type of damages suffered when the product does not meet
contract specifications. The economic loss doctrine concludes that if a
defective product causes solely economic loss, the dispute is essentially a
private matter between the contracting parties and their contract should
control their dispute. The public interest is not sufficiently involved to
merit tort involvement. On the other hand, if a defective product causes
personal injury or other property damage, then the public interest is
involved and a tort approach, free of contractual limitations, is most apt.
The doctrine has merit.
Difficulties arise, however, when one is fraudulently induced to
enter into a contract for a product, and only economic loss is incurred.
There is no personal injury or other property damage. How does the
fraud impact where the line is drawn under the economic loss doctrine?
Is the public interest sufficiently involved to invoke tort law, or is this
still a private matter between private contracting parties that invokes
only contract law? The states have taken a number of different
positions on this issue. Most states have adopted the broad fraud in the
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. The broad
exception provides that the fraud is an intentional tort, and as such, the
intentional misrepresentation is actionable as a tort, notwithstanding
that the contract losses are solely economic. A small minority of states,
including recently Wisconsin, has adopted the narrow fraud in the
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. The narrow
exception provides that if the fraudulent inducement relates to
interwoven fraud, then the fraud is not actionable under tort law, only
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contract law. The only fraud actionable under the narrow fraud in the
inducement exception is fraud considered to be extraneous to the
contract. The purpose of this Article is to examine the narrow fraud in
the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine under
Wisconsin case law, statutes, and public policy to determine if it is a
sound principle.
II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT ACTIONS
Because the economic loss doctrine determines whether a matter
proceeds in court as a tort or contract action, that decision is a
significant one. There are many differences between a tort and contract
action. First, privity is generally required in a contract action but not in
tort. 1 Second, the statutes of limitations are different. 2 The contract
statute of limitations is generally six years, 3 and the statute of
limitations for tort can be two 4 or three years. 5 Third, there are
different pleading requirements for a fraud case 6 as compared to a
contract case. 7 Fourth, the burdens of proof are different. The burden
of proof in a contract case is by "preponderance of the evidence,'' 8 and
for a fraud case, it is "clear and convincing evidence." 9 Fifth, tort
damages are designed to return the aggrieved party to his or her preevent condition and also serve as a vehicle to deter similar conduct from
1
the tortfeaso r and others .in the future. ° Contract damages are typically
expectancy damages to place the aggrieved party in the position he or
11
sbe would have been in had the contract been performed.
Sixth,
12
punitive damages are availabl f r intentional tortious concluct but

L Northridge Co. v. W.R Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 932-33, 471 N.W.2d 179, 184
(1991); Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, <J['J[ 69-70, 283 Wis. 2d 511, <j[IJ[ 69-70, 699
N.W.2d 167, 'll'J[ 69-70.
2. Northridge Co., 162 Wis. 2d at 932-33, 471 N.W.2d at 184; Grams, 2005 WI 112,
n 69-70, 283 Wis. 2d s11, n 69-70, 699 N.W.2d 167, n 69-70.
3. WIS. STAT. § 893.43 (2005-2006) (action on contract).
4. Id. § 893.57 (intentional torts).
5. Id. § 893.54 (injury to the person).
6. I d. § 802.03(2) (pleading special matters-fraud, mistake, and condition of mind); AllTech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999).
7. WIS. STAT. § 425.109(1)(h); All-Tech, 174 F.3d at 867.
8. Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 598, 130 N.W. 467, 469 (1911).
9. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, <J[ 52,262 Wis. 2d 32, <J[ 52, 662 N.W.2d
652, <J[ 52; see also Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 184, 368 N.W.2d 676, 681 (1985).
10. Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 547-48, 297 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1980).
1L RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 cmt. a (1981).
12. See Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, <J[ 38,279 Wis. 2d 52, 'l[38, 694 N.W.2d 296, <J[ 38.
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rarely are available in a contract action. 13 Tort law offers a broader
array of damages than contract law. 14 Any of the foregoing differences
may be critical depending upon the specifics of each case. When the
economic loss doctrine applies, however, the doctrine mandates that the
action be brought in contract, not tort. A forced election of remedy
occurs as a result of the economic loss doctrine being applied to a case.
III. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
The boundary between contract and tort has fluctuated with societal
Contract and tort law generally serve different
development. 15
interests. 16 Tort duties are imposed by law, and contract duties are
18
imposed by bargaining. 17 Tort duties are imposed to protect society.
There is a strong public policy component in tort duties to deter harmful
conduct. 19 For example, an intentional misrepresentation is a serious
wrong and a serious violation of community mores, which normally
invokes tort liability. 20 As a general rule, the United States Supreme
Court has noted that in cases of overlap between tort and contract
liability, tort liability should not be supplanted without good reason. 21
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States has accepted and
endorsed some form of the economic loss doctrine. 22 Only a few states
have rejected it. 23
13. White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290- 91 , 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967); Sassara v.
Braun, No. 95-3300, 1997 WL 164020, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1997).
14. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 'l!14, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 'l[14, 699 N.W.2d 167,
'll14; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, '1[24, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'l[24, 688
N.W.2d 462, 'll 24.
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 318, 592 N.W.2d
201, 206 (1999).
16. Cease, 2004 WI 139, 'l!39, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'll 39, 688 N.W.2d 462, 'll 39; Daanen &
Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395,404--05,573 N.W.2d 842, 846-77 (1998).
17. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 933, 471 N.W.2d 179, 185
(1991).
18. Daanen & Janssen, 216 Wis. 2d at 405,573 N.W.2d at 846.
19. Cease, 2004 WI 139, 'l[41 , 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'l[41, 688 N.W.2d 462, 'll 41.
20. See Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll 26, 274 Wis. 2d 63,1, 'll 26, 683 N.W.2d 46,
'l!26.
21. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875,882-83 (1997).
22. ALAB A J'vlA: Lloyd W od Coal
. v. Clark E quip. o., 543 So. 2d 671 672- 74
(A la. 1989 . ALA KA: Prall & W hitney Can. Inc. v. Sheehan 852 P.2d 117 ,ll77 (Aia.ka
l99 ); St. Denis v. Dep't of H ous. & Urban D ev., 900 F . Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Alaska 1.995).
ARI ZONA : alt Ri ver Project Agri c. I mprovement & P ower Dist. v. We tinghouse E 1ec.
Corp., 694 P2d 198 209 Ariz. 1984); ar tens v. ily of Ph enix, 75 P.3d 1081. L084 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); Ap II
roup. l nc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 479-SO 9th ir. 1995 .
CALLFO RNIA: Robinson Hel icopter
. v. Dana orp., 102 P.3d 268, 272- 74 ( al. 2004).
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COLORADO: A.C. Excnvating v. Yacht Jub 11 H mcowners Ass'n, Ll4 P. d 62 865
(C lo. 2005); Town f Alma v. Azco Constr., lnc. 10 P.Jd 1256, 1264 ( olo. 2000).
CONNE :TI T: ONN. GEN. , TAT. § 52-572c(n) (2005); Flagg Energy D v. orp. v. en .
Motors Corp .. 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Cmm. 1998) (tipplying principles of the economic loss
doctrine in " prod ucts liability case). Bw see Paliwoda v. Matllew , No. CV020398249S, 2006
onn. SL!per. LEXIS 308, , at *16 ( onn. Super. t. Ocl. 16, 2006) (noting lhe plit in
authority in lower court with regru·d to meaning of Fl(lgg) . DELAWARE: Dan{ rth v.
Acorn tructurcs lnc.,
A.2d 1194, 1198 (D l. 1992). FLORIDA: lndem. Tns. o. of .
Am . v. Am. Aviation, fnc. , 891 o. 2d 532, 536 ( Ia. 2004). EO RGlA: Gen. Elec. o. v.
Lowe's Home lrs. , Inc. 608 . .2d 636, 638 ( a. 2005). HA WAIT: Ci ty Express, Tnc. v.
xprc.~s Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 839 (Haw. 1998); State v. U.. Steel orp. , 919 P.2d 294, 302
(Haw. 1996). IDAHO: Blabd v. Richard B. mith , Inc .. 108 P.3d 99 , 1000 (Idaho 2005).
lLLrN I :First Midwest Bank, .A. v. SlewarL T itle uar. o., 843 N.E.2d 327, 333-. 4 (TU.
2006); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat I T<1nk Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (ILl. l982). INDIANA:
unkel v. RcnovaUons Inc.. 822 .E .2d 150,152 (lnd. 2005). I WA:Ueterman v. Johnson,
613 N.W.2d 259 261-62 (Iowa 2000). KAN A : Prendiville v. ontcmporary Homes, Inc., 83
P.3d 1257, 1260 Kan. t. App. 2004); Full Faith hurch or Love W. Tnc. v. Ho ver . rea ted
Wood Prods., lnc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (D. Kan. 2002) (predicting the KnJ1sas upr me
urL would agree with the Kansa
ourt of Appeals and endorse the economic Joss
doctrine). KENTUCKY: Presn·e n on tr. Managers, lnc. v. EH on tr., LLC, 134 .W.3d
575, 583 (Ky. 2004) (Keller, J., concurring) (slatin g that the court should explicitly ad plthc
econom ic I s d ctrine); Ml. Lebanon Pcrs. are Home. Lnc. v. Hoover 1liver al , Inc., 276
F.Jd 845. 849 (6lh ir. 2002 (predicting the Kentucky Supreme ourt would apply the
economic I ss doctrine to a business purchase). MAINE: Oceanside at Pin Point Condo.
Owner As. 'n v. .Peachtree Do rs, lnc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 (Me. l995). MARYLAND: Morris
v. Osm sc Wo d Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 63.[ (Md. 1995). MA SACH SETTS: Berish v.
Bornstein, 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (Mass. 2002). M.lCHlGAN: Ncibarger v. Universal Coops.,
Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992). MINNESOTA: MINN. TAT. § 04.10 (2006).
MIS IS JPPI: Progre sive Ins. Co. v. Monaco oach COrJ?., No. 1:05cv37-DMR- JMR, 200
.. Dist. LEXlS 21251 at ''5 (S.D. Mi ·s. Mar. 29, 2006); E. Miss. lee. Power Ass'n v.
Porcelain Prods. ,o. , 729 F. upp. 5U, 514 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (predicting that the Mississippi
upreme ourt would not allow recovery of olely economic losses temming from a
de(cctive product in tort); Stale Farm Mut. A uto. Ins. o. v. Ford Motor Co .. 736 So. 2d 384,
387 (Mi . t. AJ p. 1999). MlSSOURJ: Sharp Bros.
ntracting o. v. Am. Hoisl & Derrick
o., 70 .W.2d 901 903 (Mo. 1986); SeU v. Equllon Enters., LLC. No. 4:00 Vl 903 T.IA
2005 U.S. Disl. LEXIS 17288, at *40 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2005). NEBRASKA: Nat' l Crane
~orp . v.
hlo ' tecl Tube o. 332 N.W.2d 39,43 (Ncb. 1983). NEVADA: Calloway v. 'ty of
Reno 993 !J.2d 1259, 1266 (Nev. 2000) rev 'd on orher grounds. Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31,
33 (2004). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 891 A.2d 477 495
(N.H. 2005 . NEW J R EY: Alloway v. Gen. Marine lndll!i., L.P., 695 A.2d 264. 275 ( ..J .
1997). NEW MEXICO: 111 re onsol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig. 893 P.2d 438,445-46
(N.M. 1995). N .. w Y RK: Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors
rp., 645 N.E.2d J 195
1196, 11 9 ( .Y. 1995). N RT I-1: CAR UNA: Moore v. COachmen Indus. lnc., 499 S. .2d
772.780 (N. . l. App. 1998). NORTH DAKOTA: Leiner v. Ford Motor
., 606 N.W.2d
881, 885 (N .D. 2000). OHIO: orp rex Dev. & Constr. Mgmt. , Inc. v. hook. lnc., 835
N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ohio 2005). OKLAHOMA: Dutsch v. Sea Ray B<lals. Inc.. 845 P.2d I 7,
.19 (Ok la. 1992); Waggoner v. Town & ountry Mobile Homes, lnc., 808 .P.2d 49, 653
(Okh1. I 90); Ullited G If, LL v. Westlake hem. rp., No. 05- CV- 0495- VE- PJ , 2006
lJ .. D.i t. LEX! 57531, at *7 ( .D. Okla. Aug. l5, 2006). OREGON: Harris v, Suniga, 149
P. d 224, 227
r. 2006): r. Stee l Mill · Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand , LLP. 83 P.3d 322, 328
( r. 2004); On ita Pac. Corp. v. Tr. f Bronson 843 P 2d 890, 896- 97 (Or. 1992)· Hale v.
roce. 744 P.2d U89, 1290 (O r. 1987). PENNSYLV ANJA: Bill- Rite on tractor . v.
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The economic loss doctrine developed largely in response to the
extension of product liability law into contract law. Product liability law
protects buyers of products from personal injury and damage to other
property. 24 Product liability law does not cover cases where the loss is
solely economic. The theory behind the economic loss doctrine is that
once a bargain is struck and contract terms are agreed upon, the buyer
should not be able to circumvent the contract terms via tort. 25 However,
there needs to be a balance struck between honoring the parties'
contract and protecting the public from dangerous products. 26 Clearly,
when one suffers personal injury or other property damage from a
defective product, the balance is in favor of tort. On the other hand,
when solely economic loss is involved, the balance is in favor of the
contract to control the parties' dispute.
The policy arguments for imposing tort duties are diminished where
only economic loss is involved. 27 "Whether a product meets a certain
level of performance or a purchaser's expectations is not a matter of

Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286-87 (Pa. 2005). RHODE ISLAND: Rousseau v. K.N.
Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999) (holding economic loss rule is inapplicable to
consumer transactions); Bo. l n Jnv. Prop. #1 tate v. E.W.. Burman, Inc. , 658 A.2d 515, 518
(R.I. 1995). SOUTH CARO UNA: Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon,
Jones & Goulding, Inc. 463 . .2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995). SOUTH OAK TA: Diamond Surface
Inc. v. SLHie emem Plant Comm 'n, 583 N. W.2d 155, 161 (S.D. 1998). TENNESSE ~: Messer
ricsbeim indus. lnc. v. Eastman hem.
., 194 S.W.3d 466,471- 72 (T nn. l. ApJ>. 2005);
Tri nity lndus. fnc. v. McKinnon Bri.d e o., 77 .W.3d 159, 173 ('I'enn. Ct. App. 2001).
TEXAS: Formosa Pi a tics orp. SA v. Presicli Eng rs & ontractors, 960 S.W.2d 41 45
(Tex. 1998). UTAH: Hermansen v. Tasuli . 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002). VERMONT :
Hamill v. Pawtuck ! Mul. lns.
., 92 A.2d 226, 229 Vt. 2005). VIR INlA: Filak v.
George, 594 S.E.2d 10 613 (Va. 2004). WASlliNGT N: Alejandre v. Bull, 9 P.3d 844,852
(Wash . t. App. 2004); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle , ch. Oist. No. I, 881 P.2d
~ 86, 990 (Wa h. L994); Reynolds Metals o, v. A lcan Inc., No. 04-017SRJB, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29033, at *8-*9 (W.O. Wash. Apr. 28, 2006). WEST VIRGINIA: Aikens v. Debow,
541 S.E .2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000). WISCONSIN: 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group,
Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 'l! 5, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'lJ 5, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'lJ 5. WYOMING: D & D
Transp., Ltd. v. Interline Energy Servs., Inc., 117 P.3d 423, 427 (Wyo. 2005).
23. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has chosen not to adopt the economic loss doctrine.
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 878 S.W.2d 741, 743 {Ark. 1994); Blagg v. Fred Hunt
Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981). Montana has likewise declined to follow the economic
loss doctrine. Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc. v. HKM Assocs., 878 P.2d 248, 252, 255 (Mont.
1994).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCfS LIABILITY§ 21 (1998).
25. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 329-30, 592
N.W.2d 201, 211 (1999).
26. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (W.O. Wis. 1997).
27. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 573 N.W.2d 842,
847 (1998).

1
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societal interest." 28 Rather it is the domain of contract law. 29 Thus, as a
general rule, in the absence of any tort concern, contract law is better
suited to govern the parties' dispute. Societal interests direct that the
nature of the damages incurred is apparently the tipping point for the
economic loss doctrine. A dangerous or defective product that causes
no personal injury or other property damage is not actionable under tort
law, only contract law. 30 Since only economic losses have been incurred,
the parties' contract understandably should govern their dispute.
Interject negligence into the transaction, and the economic loss doctrine
still provides that the parties' contract shall control their dispute over
the economic losses. 31 The negligence does not arouse sufficient public
policy concerns to permit the aggrieved party to assert the tort to
recover solely economic losses. In other words, there is not a sufficient
basis to circumvent the contract with a tort claim.
The decision to prefer the contract over negligence is consistent with
established contract and tort principles. Under contract law, parties are
permitted by contract to exculpate themselves from liability for
.
32
neg1rgence.
Public policy does not disfavor such bargaining. In fact, the
economic loss doctrine expects parties to bargain with reference to all
foreseeable matters within their contractual relationship. 33 Thus, when
the economic loss doctrine mandates that the contract shall govern the
recovery of solely economic losses despite negligence, no established
public policy is disturbed. In fact, the economic loss doctrine is
consistent with established public policy and precedent. On the other
hand, public policy favors tort responsibility when a product causes
personal injury or other property damage, notwithstanding contractual
terms to the contrary. 34

28. State Farm, 225 Wis. 2d at 321,592 N.W.2d at 207.
29. !d.
30. RESTATEMENT (THTRD) Or TORTS: PRODU ·s L IABl UTY § 21 (1998).
3 1. B ut see lns.
. of N. Am. v. ease Elec. Inc., 2004 Wl 139, !]! 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361,
<[52. 688 .W.2d 462 'II 52 (holding that the economic loss doctrine doe: not app ly to
contracts for . ervices). See also John D. Fi nerty, Jr . & ha rles J. rucger, A ommentary 011
the Economi · Loss Doctrine U11der the RIJ/e of ease Electric an d ascade lo ne, 89 MA RQ.
. R EV. 137 (2005 (cri ticizin g tbe decision to exempt service c nlracts from app licatio n of
tbe economic loss doctrine).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195 cmt. a (1981).
33. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <j[ 48, 283 Wis. 2d 555,
<j[ 48,699 N.W.2d 205, 'J[48.
34. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1962); WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3) (2005-2006); Wausau Tile, Inc. v.
County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 248,593 N.W.2d 445, 452 (1999).
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IV. THE GENESIS AND GROWTH OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
IN WISCONSIN

The Wisconsin Supreme Court first recognized the economic loss
doctrine in 1989. 35 In Sunnyslope Grading, Inc., two commercial parties
entered into a contract for the sale of a machine. 36 The contract
contained warranties and limitation of remedies as provided by the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Subsequently, the machine
developed problems, and the buyer sought consequential damages. The
contract, however, expressly precluded the recovery of consequential
damages. 37 As a result, the buyer sued in tort to avoid the contractual
limitations.
The Supreme Court concluded that "a commercial
purchaser of a product cannot recover solely economic losses" in tort
where the parties have negotiated a contract that defines the buyer's
remedies. 38
A number of rationales are used to support the decision that
prevents a tort action from circumventing the contract. One, of course,
is to honor the contract. Theoretically, each party has negotiated the
best terms available through their mutual promises, and absent some
superseding reason, each should receive the benefit of their bargain.
Another rationale is that the U.C.C. is a carefully constructed legislative
framework that governs transactions in machines (goods), and tort law
should not be used to undermine the U.C.C.'s application. The reasons
often stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court are: (1) to "maintain[] the
fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law"; (2) to
protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by
contract; and (3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk
of economic loss, the commercial buyer, to "assume, allocate, or insure
against" that risk. 39 Unquestionably, these are strong rationales that
supported the Wisconsin Supreme Court's adoption of the economic
loss doctrine. 40

35. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916,
437 N.W.2d 213,215 (1989).
36. Id. at 912-13,437 N.W.2d at 214.
37. /d. at 914, 437 N.W.2d at 214.
38. Id. at 921,437 N.W.2d at 217-18.
39. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111 , H 46, 48, 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555,
9l'll 46, 48, 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, H 46, 48, 50 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids,
Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 410, 573 N.W.2d 842, 849 (1997)).
40. The United States Supreme Court also adopted the economic loss doctrine in East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U .S. 858, 874-75 (1986).
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The economic loss doctrine has landed in fertile ground in
Wisconsin. The doctrine's humble origin was a dispute over a defective
"product" between "commercial parties" that resulted in a tort barrier
41
in a U.C.C. case. Notably, the doctrine has three components that
could have been used to curtail its growth. First, the doctrine wa
limited to a "product" 42 or more specifically a 'good.' 43 Second the
transaction was between commercial parties. And third, the doctrine
44
wa appli ed to a U.C.C. ca e where Article 2 has detailed and explicit
rul es that g vern the parties transaction. In all three areas the
doctrin s scope has been expanded.
he d fini tion of a pr oduct has been expanded from a good to also
include real property, including a new home 45 and a forty-two unit
condominium complex. 46 The doctrine's coverage has increased from
applying to commercial transactions to also include consumer
transactions. 47 Finally, the doctrine has been expanded beyond U.C.C.
disputes to any contract dispute involving a product. 48
The growth of the economic loss doctrine has not been limited to
simply expanding its three components. The scope of the economic loss
doctrine has also been expanded by limiting the traditional areas of tort
coverage. A em Uary of the economic loss doctrine is that if a defective
product cau es per nal injury or other property damage, then tort
theories are available t the aggrieved party. How ver, two exceptions
to the 'other property" provi j n have further limited tort availability
and thereby expanded the scope of the economic loss doctrine.
The first exception is the "integrated systems" exception. The
integrated systems exception provides that damage by a defective
product that is a component of an integrated system, to either the

41. Sunnyslope, 148 Wis. 2d at 916, 437 N.W.2d at 215 .
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 19 (1998) .
43. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1962) ; WIS. STAT.§ 402.105(b)- (c) (2005-2006).
44. WIS. STAT. §§ 402.101-725 (2005- 2006).
45. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co. , 2005 WI 113, 'l[25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'll 25, 699 N.W .2d
189, 'l[25.
46. 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 'l[67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'll 67,
716 N.W.2d 822, 'll 67.
47. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 324, 592 N.W.2d
201, 209 (1999).
48. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co. , 2005 WI 111, 'l!27, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'll 27,
699 N.W .2d 205, '1{27; Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll'l!19-20, 274 Wis. 2d 631 , 'll'l!1920, 683 N.W.2d 46, 'll'l!19-20; Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227,
1233 (W.D . Wis. 1997).
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system or other system components, is not damage to other property.
Thus, tort theories are not available to the aggrieved party.
The second exception is the "disappointed performance
expectations" exception. This exception provides that other property
has also not been damaged when the "prevention of the subject risk was
one of the contractual expectations motivating the purchase of the
defective product." 50 In other words, if a defective product causes other
property damage, but the damage could have been within the scope of
the bargaining, it does not qualify as other property damage. The net
effect of both exceptions to the other property provision is to expand
the coverage of the economic loss doctrine and to curtail the application
of tort principles. In a final expansion, the economic loss doctrine has
been applied to circumstances where there was no contract between the
parties 51 and solely economic losses were incurred.
There have been some limits, however, placed on the economic loss
doctrine. The most significant limitation is that it does not apply to
contracts where the primary purpose is to provide services. 52 The courts
use the "predominant" test to determine whether the contract
predominantly involves providing a service or the sale of a product. 53
Another limitation is the "public safety" exception. The public safety
exception provides that where a product has an intrinsic health hazard,
tort theories are available to the aggrieved party even though only
economic losses have been incurred.54 The public safety exception,
however, has not been used other than for one case of installing asbestos
in a shopping center. 55 Other than the two limitations noted above, the
economic loss doctrine has been greatly expanded by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Wisconsin now has one of the broadest coverages in
the United States.

49. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 245, 593 N.W.2d 445 ,
452 (1999) .
50. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, !J[ 43, 283 Wis. 2d 511, !J[ 43, 699 N.W.2d 167,
!J[ 43 (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 975 (E .D. Wis. 1999)).
51. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, <j[ 17, 283 Wis. 2d 606, <j[ 17,699 N.W.2d
189,<j[17.
52. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, !J[ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 9[ 52, 688
N.W.2d 462, 9[52. But see Finerty & Crueger, supra note 31 (criticizing the Cease decision).
53. Linden, 2005 WI 113, 9! 8, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 9! 8, 699 N.W.2d 189, <j[ 8.
54. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 937-38,471 N.W.2d 179, 186
(1991).
55. See Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 922, 937-38, 471 N.W.2d at 180, 186; see also Wausau
Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 264-65, 593 N.W.2d 445, 458-59 (1999)
(rejecting the public safety exception) .
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V. IDENTIFYING ECONOMIC LOSSES
The tipping point between contract and tort under the economic loss
doctrine is the type of damages suffered. If a defective product causes
solely economic loss then contract law controls. On the other hand, if a
defective product causes personal injury or other property damage, then
tort law controls. Thus, it is critical to be able to identify solely
economic losses. Economic losses are those damages that arise
whenever the product does not perform as agreed, "including damage to
the product itself or monetary losses caused by the product." 56
Economic losses include the difference in value between what is
received and the value as represented; 57 the cost of repair or
replacement; 58 lost profits; 59 the costs of paying third party claims as a
result of the defective product; 60 and any other losses that are not
personal injury or other property damage.61
VI. THE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC
LOSS DOCTRINE

Fraud in the inducement is "when a misrepresentation leads another
to enter into a transaction with a false impression of the risks, duties, or
obligati ns invol ved." 62 In general, courts have taken three approaches
wh n fra ud i used to induce one to enter into a contract and solely
ec nomic los es are incurred.63 The first approach is to ignore the fraud
and the defra uded party's remedy is solely contract, not tort. 64 The
second approach is a broad exception that recognizes the fraud as a tort
in all cases of fraudulent inducement. 65 The defrauded party is free to

56. Linden, 2005 WI 113, '![ 6, 283 Wis. 2d 606, '![ 6, 699 N.W.2d 189, '![ 6.
57. Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 926, 471 N.W.2d at 182.
58. !d., 471 N.W.2d at 182; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis.
2d 305, 343, 592 N.W.2d 201 , 216 (1999); Wausau Tile, Inc. , 226 Wis. 2d at 248, 593 N.W.2d at
452.
59. Wausau Tile, Inc., 226 Wis. 2d at 257, 593 N.W.2d at 455; Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at
926, 471 N.W.2d at 182; 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, '![ 24, 293
Wis. 2d 410, '![ 24, 716 N.W.2d 822, '![ 24.
60. Wausau Tile, Inc., 226 Wis. 2d at 253,593 N.W .2d at 454.
61. 1325 N. Van Buren, 2006 WI 94, '![ 24, 293 Wis. 2d 410, '![ 24, 716 N.W.2d 822, '![ 24;
State Farm , 22.5 Wis. 2d at 320, 592 N.W.2d at 207.
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004) .
63. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '![ 31, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 31 ,
699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31.
64. !d. '![ 31 , 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 31, 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31.
65. !d., 283 Wis. 2d 555 , '![ 31 , 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31.

932

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:921
66

seek a remedy in tort. Seven states have adopted the broad exception,
and federal courts have indicated that thirteen other states will likely
adopt it. 67 The rationale of the broad approach is that the deceitful
66. ALABAMA: Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726 So. 2d 626, 631 (Ala. 1998) (stating that
the court has often allowed fraudulent inducement claims for economic loss from
misrepresented value of a product, even when the product was working properly).
CALIFORNIA: Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004) (citing
Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 983 (Cal. 1999)) (stating that tort damages have been
allowed in contract cases for fraudulent inducement). COLORADO: Town of Alma v. Azco
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263-64 (Colo. 2000) (stating that the economic loss rule does not
apply to claims arising from a duty independent of contract and that common law fraud is an
independent duty); United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227
(lOth Cir. 2000) (finding that Colorado's economic loss rule only applies to some forms of
negligence . HA WAll: ta te v. U.S. Steel orp., 919 P.2d 294, 02 (Haw. 1996) (stating that
111 economic los$ d ctrin d es not apply t claims of negligent misrepresentation or fraud).
ILLINOIS: Moorman Mfg. o. v. Nat' I Tank o., 4 5 N. - .2d 443, 452 (UJ. 1982) (stating that
economic loss is recoverable when false representations are made); Faust Printing, Inc. v.
MAN Capital Corp., No. 02- -9345, 2006 U.S. Di ' l. LEXlS 44140, at *20 (N.D . Ill. June 16,
2006) (finding the fraudulen t misrepresentation exception from Moorman is still viable).
NEBRASKA: Streeks, Inc. v. Diamond Hill Farms, Lnc., 605 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Neb. 2000)
(stating that a purchaser is not limited to con tract and may bring an action for fraudulent
misrepresentation as well). TEXAS: Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs &
Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (holding that damages can be recovered for
fraudulent inducement even when misrepresentations concern the subject matter of the
contract).
67 . IOWA: Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 872, 887 (N.D . Iowa 1999)
(predicting that Iowa would adopt a broad fraud exception and not follow Florida's narrow
exception). MASSACHUSETTS: Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp.
1189, 1192 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that "[t]he economic loss rule does not apply to
intentional misrepresentations"). MARYLAND: Superior Bank, F.S.B. v. Tandem Nat'!
Mortgage, Inc., No. MJG-99-2360, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22224, at *8 (D. Md. May 12, 2000)
(stating that when "misrepresentations induce [a party] to enter into a contract, the economic
loss rule does not apply") . MINNESOTA: Lester Bldg. Sys. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., No.
A03-48, 2004 Minn . App. LEXIS 156, at *16-*18 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004) (finding that
federal cases interpreting Minnesota law did not consider the recent amendment to the
ec n mic lo s sta tute and lhat the fraud ex·e mptiort does n t mention anylhing abollt needing
to be extraneous of the contract). EB RASKA: Accurate mmc'ns, LL v. Starlcl Corp .•
. 4:05CV3286, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXT. 11 232, at ~· 9-10 (D. Neb. f1' b. 2 , 2006) (finding tha t
ebraska Jaw will allow a plai ntiff lo bring a breach of contract and misrcpresentut.i.on ac tion
simultaneously). N VADA: Yerington Ford, Inc. v. Gen. Mo tors Acceptance orp., 359 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, l083-84 (D. ev. 2004) (noting tha t tort claims will be barred when not
independent of c ntractual duties, but fraud in the inducement is always extraneous of the
c nl'ract). NEW JER E Y: Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 557, 56 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding that in New Jersey, fraud must be extraneous to the
contract in order to survive the economic loss rule, and noting that fraud in the inducement is
generally extraneous to the contract). NEW YORK: EED Holdings v. Palmer Johnson
Acquisition Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 265, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding it well established in
New York law that fraudulent inducement is collateral to the contract and will support a
fraud claim). OHIO: Onyx Envtl. Servs., LLC v. Maison, 407 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (N.D. Ohio
2005) (finding that fraud in the inducement implicates a duty distinct from contractual duties,
and thus the economic loss doctrine does not apply). SOUTH CAROLINA: Enhance-It,
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conduct arouses a sufficient public interest to permit tort principles to
apply to remedy the wrong. The third approach is a narrow exception
that recognizes the fraud as a tort only where the fraud is not
interwoven with the quality or character of the goods or otherwise
involves performance of the contract. In other words, the fraud is
actionable as a tort only if it is extraneous to the subject matter of the
contract. Wisconsin, Florida, and arguably Michigan 68 are the only
states to adopt the narrow exception. 69 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
offered three rationales for adopting the narrow approach. 7° First, the
narrow exception maintains the fundamental distinction between
contract and tort law. 71 Matters that are expressly or implicitly dealt
with in the contract, such as the performance or quality or character of
the goods sold, still must be addressed by the contract. Second, the
narrow exception promotes and protects the parties' freedom to
contract. 72 The parties are expected to negotiate with reference to all
those matters that one would expect should be addressed in the
contract. Third, the narrow exception encourages the party with the
best understanding of the attendant risks, the buyer, to assume, allocate,
L.L.C. v. Am. Access Techs., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 626, 634 (D.S.C. 2006) (finding that a party
induced into entering a contract has the election of either tort or contract remedies).
SOUTH DAKOTA: N.W. Pub. Serv. v. Union Carbide Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170
(D.S.D. 2000) (predicting the South Dakota Supreme Court would adopt a broad fraud
exception). UTAH: Associated Diving & Marine Contractors v. Granite Constr. Co., No.
2:01CV330DB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21560, at *23 (D. Utah July 10, 2003) (finding a claim
for fraud in the inducement cannot be barred by the economic loss doctrine). VIRGINIA:
McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc. v. A.T. Kearney, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (E.D. Va.
2003) (finding that fraud that precedes contract formation does not implicate a contractual
duty and that the economic loss rule will not apply); City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt.
Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that fraud implicates a tort duty and
that the economic loss rule only bars those claims arising from contractual duties).
68. The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet decided amongst the three approaches.
69. FLORIDA: HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996) (finding tort claims must be independent of the contractual obligations or they are
barred by the economic loss rule); Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 54243 (Fla. 2004). MICHIGAN: Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc.,
532 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding tort claims must be extraneous from
contract matter); GE Healthcare Fin. Servs. v. Cardiology & Vascular Assocs., No. 05-71304,
2006 WL 950268, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2006) (holding that plaintiff must show a
misrepresentation is "extraneous to the contract"). WISCONSIN: Kaloti Enters., Inc. v.
Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <J[ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 42, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 42 (finding
fraud in the inducement will be barred by the economic loss doctrine unless extraneous to the
contract).
70. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, <J[<J[ 46, 48, 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[<J[ 46, 48, 50, 699 N.W.2d 205,
n 46, 48, 5o.
71. !d. <J[ 46, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 46, 699 N.W.2d 205, <Jl 46.
72. !d. <J[ 48, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 48, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 48.
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or insure against the risk of fraud on interwoven terms. 73 Federal courts
have indicated that five other states will likely adopt the narrow
exception. 74 Some states have not given any indication whether a fraud
in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine will be
. d .75
recogmze
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception requires the
aggrieved party to establish: (1) that all the elements of intentional
misrepresentation
are
present; 76
(2)
that
the intentional
misrepresentation occurred prior to contract formation; and (3) that the
77
The narrow
fraud relates to a matter extraneous to the contract.
exception requires the court to draw a distinction between those matters
that are interwoven with the contract and those that are extraneous.
Only the concept of interwoven is defined.

73. Id. 'll 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'l! 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'll 50.
74. ARIZONA: QC Constr. Prods., LLC v. Cohill's Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 423 F. Supp.
2d 1008, 1015-16 (D. Ariz. 2006) (finding that fraud claims are barred by the economic loss
doctrine as not distinct from breach of contract). DELAWARE: Pinkert v. John J. Olivieri,
P.A., No. 99-380-SCR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8133, at *18 (D. Del. May 24, 2001) (finding
that fraud claims will be barred by economic loss doctrine if not contingent on duties outside
of contract); In re Crown-Simplimatic Inc., 299 B.R. 319, 324 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding
that fraud in the inducement claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine as the violated
rights were encompassed in contract). KENTUCKY: Strathmore Web Graphics v. Sanden
Mach., Ltd., No. 3:99CV-345-S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22618, at *9-10 (W.D. Ky. May 16,
2000) (holding that fraud in the inducement claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine
as the fraud was not distinct from breach of contract or warranty claims). But cf. Davis v.
Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (refusing to bar
a fraud in the inducement claim stemming from an employment contract without guidance
from Kentucky courts). MISSOURI: Self v. Equilon Enters., LLC, No. 4:00CV1903 TIA,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288, at *40 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2005) (predicting that the Missouri
Supreme Court would hold that the economic loss rule would bar all fraud claims that were
not independent of the contract). PENNSYLVANIA: Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286
F.3d 661, 680 (3d Cir. 2002) (predicting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would find
that the economic loss doctrine would bar intentional torts, but that fraud in the inducement
will be an exception if extraneous to the subject matter of the contract); Lake St. Gaming,
LLC v. !Games Entm't, Inc., No. 04-4965, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38141, at *8, *10 (E. D. Pa.
June 8, 2006) (requiring fraud in the inducement claim to be based on facts not embodied in
contract); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (following Werwinski, stating that even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
applied the economic loss doctrine to bar fraud claims, fraud in the inducement would be
allowed if extraneous to subject matter of the contract).
75. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
76. Wis. JI-Civil2401 (2005) (misrepresentation: intentional deceit).
77. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 'l[42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'l!42, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'l[42.
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Interwoven contract terms arise in two different ways. The fir t i
terms that relate to the quality or character of the product that is the
subject matter of the contract. 78 Those term that relate to the quality or
character of the product are further defined a either: (1) expressly dealt
with in the contract or (2) relating to the "reasonable expectations of
the parties to the risk of loss in the event the goods purchased did not
79
meet tl1e purchaser's expectations. '
The second way interwoven
contract terms arise is in matters that involve performance under the
contract.Sil No definition is provided to identify tho e matters that
involve performance under the contract. More importantly the decision
to distinguish interwoven terms and extraneous terms is a murky one.
Even for those few states that have adopted the narrow exception, the
guidance is uneven.
In Wisconsin, the supreme court adopted the narrow fraud in the
inducement exception in Kaloti v. Kellogg Enterprises Inc. 81 In Kaloti, a
food wholesaler brought an action against a cereal company and its
representative for damages it incurred as a re ult of Kellogg's failure to
disclose a change in the: company's marketing strategy. 82 The contract
was for the sale of food products that Kaloti intended to resell to
retailers. At the time of the contract Kellogg had also decided to sell
directly to the same retailers, but it did not disclose that fact to Kaloti.
The court concluded tlllat Kellogg's failure to disclose the change in
marketing strategy was an intentional misrepresentation. 83 Further, the
court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation was extraneous
to, not interwoven with, the contract. The court reasoned that the
misrepresentation did not regard the quality or character of the product
sold or performance under the contract.
"Rather, the alleged
misrepresentation concerned a matter whose risk was never
contemplated to be a part of the contract to purchase Kellogg's
products." 84
It is difficult to see how Kellogg's decision to sell directly to Kaloti's
customers is not a matter involving performance under the contract or
otherwise interwoven in the sale of the product. Obviously, this is a
difficult decision to make. Little guidance is provided from the other
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

/d. ~

43 283 Wi . 2d 555, Cj{ 43, 699 N.W.2d 205, ~ 43.
ld. , 283 Wis. 2d 555, '1 43, 699 N.W.2d 205, '[ 43.
/d. <Ji 42,283 Wis. 2d 555, 1 42, 699 N.W.2cl205, ~ 42.
ld., 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.
!d. '1. 6, 283 Wis. 2d 555, Cf 6, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'I! 6.
ld. 1( 52> 283 Wis. 2d 555, f{ 52, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'll 52.
/d. <]!45, 283 Wis. 2d 555,1 45, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'l[ 45.
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states that have adopted the narrow exception. In Michigan, no cases
have been decided to illustrate those terms that are extraneous to the
subject matter. In Florida, the cases decided after the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the narrow exception 85 are perplexing. In Allen v.
Stephan Co., the seller of a business made representations that the
business "had paid its taxes, filed all necessary tax returns and that the
company's financial statements accurately disclosed all of its
liabilities." 86 The representations were incorporated into the sales
agreement. The Florida Court of Appeals held that the fraud claim was
not barred by the economic loss doctrine even though the fraudulent
inducement related to matters included in the contract. 87 Similarly, in
La Pesca Grande Charters v. Moran, the seller of a yacht made
representations that its engines were recently rebuilt, that the hull was
sound, and that the fire extinguisher system was operational. 88 The
representations were false, and the buyer sued for fraud. The trial court
dismissed the fraud claim. 89 The Florida District Court of Appeals,
however, reversed. The buyer was permitted to pursue its fraud claim
though the representations unquestionably were interwoven terms. 90
Clearly, the narrow exception has only been marginally adopted and is
difficult to apply.
VII. CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND FRAUD
A. The "As Is" Clause and Fraud

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception clearly contradicts
the well-established principle that fraudulent conduct is punished as a
tort despite a clause in the party's contract that may provide otherwise.
An "as is" clause is a common clause used in the sale of a property.
Essentially "[a]n 'as is' clause puts the burden on the buyer ... to
determine the condition of the property being purchased. " 91 This is
essentially the same as the third rationale used by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in adopting the narrow exception, which is to encourage
85. HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996).
86. 784 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
87. !d. at 458.
88. 704 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
89. !d.
90. !d.
91. McCabe v. Midwest Evergreens, Inc. No. 95-2148, 1996 WL 118456, at *1 (Wis. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1996); see Fulton v. Vogt, No. 96-1972, 1998 WL 313409, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
June 16, 1998).
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the party with the best understanding of the attendant risks, the buyer,
92
to assume, allocate, and insure against the risk. An as is clause is a
93
complete disclaimer of any implied warranties. Further, the seller has
no duty to investigate where the contract contains an as is clause. 94 If
property i sold as is and there i no fraud in the process, the clause is
effective. 95 On the other hand, once fraud is introduced into the
process, the contract clause is no longer effective. The as is clause does
not protect one from a lawsuit based on one's intentional
misrepresentation. 96 The courts have clearly indicated that one's fraud
supersedes the negotiated contract terms. Public policy dictate that a
deceitful person cannot hide behind an as i clause in a contract. The
fraud is actionable under tort law despite the contract clause negotiated
between the parties. 97 The rationale underlying the courts' decisions i
clear. The seller, not the buyer, is the party best able to understand the
attendant risks in the transaction. The seller is introducing fraud into
the transaction. Focusing tort liabilities on the seller is the most
effective way to insure against deceitful conduct by sellers in the future.
Requiring the buyer to protect himself against the seller's fraud is
pressure applied at the wrong point. The courts have recognized this
principle when as is clauses and fraud have conflicted in the past. The
courts have not required a buyer to protect himself in a contract against
a seller's deceitful conduct as the Kellogg decision requires.

B. The Parol Evidence Rule and Fraud
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss
doctrine completely undercuts the policy and rationale for creating the
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule
provides that prior or contemporaneous evidence is not admissible to
vary or contradict the terms of a written contract that is final and
complete. 98 The rule is also stated that a "completely integrated

92. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <J[ 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555,
50, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 50.
93. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) {1998); WIS. STAT. § 402.316(3) {2005-2006).
94. Chapman v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 699, 708 (B.D. Wis. 1999).
95. Raskin v. Chrysler Realty Corp., No. 93-1218, 1994 WL 621954, at *4-*5 (Wis. Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 1994); Omernik v. Bushman, 151 Wis. 2d 299, 303, 444 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Ct.
App.1989).
96. McCabe, 1996 WL 118456, at *1; Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 49,496 N.W.2d 106,
112 (Ct. App. 1992).
97. McCabe, 1996 WL 118456, at *1; Grube,173 Wis. 2d at 62,496 N.W.2d at 118.
98. WIS. STAT.§ 402.202 {2005-2006).
<J[
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agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are
within its scope." 99 The rule is a substantive rule of contract law, not
evidence. 100 Frequently, parties use an integration or merger clause to
maximize the impact of the parol evidence rule. An integration or
merger clause is "[a] contractual provision stating that the contract
represents the parties' complete and final agreement and supersedes all
informal understandings and oral agreements relating to the subject
matter of the contract." 101 Thus, the contract consists of only the written
terms, and nothing extraneous can be considered to add to or vary the
written contract. The extrinsic evidence barred by the parol evidence
rule are those terms that reasonably 102 or certainly 103 would have been
included in the written contract. The parol evidence rule essentially
precludes the admissibility of interwoven terms.
The parol evidence rule as stated in the U.C.C. is silent on whether
prior or contemporaneous evidence of fraud can be admitted to prove
the tort of intentional misrepresentation despite the existence of a
contract that is final and complete. 104 Nevertheless, the U.C.C. cases do
permit a tort suit for intentional misrepresentation, despite the parol
evidence rule or an integration clause. 105 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, on the other hand, expressly recognizes fraud as an exception
to the parol evidence rule. 106 The courts have uniformly recognized the
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule despite a party's failure to
•
d d'1sclatmer,
.
t08
•
•
l
109 I
or an mtegratwn
cause.
n
rea d t h e contract, 101 a s1gne
making the decision whether to admit evidence of fraud in the face of
the parol evidence rule, the courts have had to weigh the advantage of
contract certainty against the harm that would result from fraud. The
courts have concluded that the better public policy is to abandon the

99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(2) (1981).
100. !d. § 213 cmt. 1; H & M Italian Food Corp. v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp., No. 881257, 1989 WL 53664, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989).
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209(3) (1981).
103. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1962).
104. Id.
105. Franklin v. Lovitt Equip., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1982); George Robberecht
Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va. 1979); Cone Mills Corp. v. A.G.
Estes, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 222,225 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 214 (1981).
107. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724,732-33,456 N.W.2d 585,589 (1990).
108. State v. Keehn, 74 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 246 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1976).
109. See Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 459, 67 N.W.2d
853, 857 (1955).
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contract position in favor of redressing the wrong committed by the
fraud. 110 The same public policy that sanctions the promises obtained by
deceit must avoid all attempts to circumvent that policy by means of any
contractual devices, including the parol evidence rule. For courts to rule
otherwise would open the door to a multitude of frauds that would be
hidden behind the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule was
designed to prevent fraud, not to be used to perpetrate fraud.m
The clear policy is to admit any evidence of intentional
misrepresentation, despite the parol evidence rule. Upon proof of the
fraud, punitive damages are often awarded against the tortfeasor. 112
Paradoxically, a situation may now occur in a contract setting where the
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule could be used to admit
evidence of interwoven terms, but the fraud would not be actionable as
a tort under the narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine because
the fraud relates to interwoven terms. The point of the fraud exception
to the parol evidence rule is to punish the deceitful tortfeasor, which, of
course, will always be defeated by the narrow exception to the economic
loss doctrine.
C. Contract Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception is against public
policy because it permits a deceitful person to accomplish indirectly that
which the person could not accomplish directly through the party's
contract. Freedom of contract generally leads a court to conclude that
exculpatory clauses and disclaimers, if fairly bargained, should be
enforced. 113 On the other hand, tort principles generally cause a court to
be reluctant to shift the burden from the tortfeasor to the victim who
has no control or responsibility for the offending conduct. Exculpatory
clauses, however, can exempt one from liability for negligent behavior
under prescribed circumstances. 114 As a result, one party insulates
himself from liability for his negligence. 115 Such contractual provisions

110. Id. at 460, 67 N.W.2d at 857.
111. H & M Italian Food Corp. v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp., No. 88-1257, 1989 WL
53664, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989).
112. See id. at *5.
113. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, '][ 25, 277 Wis. 2d 303, '][ 25, 691
N.W.2d 334, '][ 25; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 600,
345 N.W.2d 417,423 (1984).
114. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, 'J['J[ 15, 17, 25, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 'J['J[ 15, 17, 25, 691 N.W.2d 334,
'J['J[ 15, 17, 25; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc., 117 Wis. 2d at 591, 345 N.W.2d at 419.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195(2) (1981).
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are permitted as acceptable public policy. However, if fraud in the
inducement is utilized to induce one to sign the exculpatory clause or
disclaimer, then public policy will not permit enforcement of the
clauses. 116 On the other hand, public policy dictates that " [a] term
exempting a party from tort liabiJjty for harm caused intenti nally or
recklessly is unenforceable. ' 117 Wisconsin c urts have r gularly
recognized this principJe. m The principle is grounded in und public
policy that tort law impo es standards of conduct for the protection f
the public. Thus a party sh uld not be able to exempt himself by
contract for harm that he or she intentionally or recklessly causes. 11q
Specifically a party cannot by contract exculpate himself or her elf from
the legal consequences of fraud. 120 Many year ago, the Wi cousin
Supreme Court recognized Umt an expres agreement made in a
conu·act that the contract shall be incontestable for Craud is void as
121
At least ne state has by tatute prohibited any
against public policy.
contract term that exempt one for respon ibility for one's intentional
122
Such clauses have also been held to be again t
rnisrepresentation.
public policy in securities fraud litigation where the contract eliminates
the liability for any fraudulent misrepresentations in the ale ( the
ecw.-ilies. 1v There is a clea1· public policy that a party cann t y
contract exculpate himself or herself from liability for deceitful conduct.
Public policy does not permit the torlfea or under any circumstance to
contract away his responsibility for hi deceitful conduct. Yet the
narrow exception to th economic loss d ctrine prevents a defrauded
party fr m uing lhe tortfea or for the intenti nal tort committed when
the fraud is interwoven with the contract. In other word the deceitful
person is able to accomplish through the narrow exception (immunity
from a tort cause of action for deceit) that which one could not

116. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 215, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Anderson v.
Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 460, 67 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1955); Malas v.
Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 534, 214 N.W. 332, 333 (1927).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 195(1) (1981).
118. Mala , 193 Wi . at534, 2l4 N.W. at 333; Finch v. oulhsidc Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
2004 WI App 110, '!!23. 274 Wis. 2d 719,, 23, 6 5 N.W.2d 154,123: Atkins, 2005 WI 4 'l[ 19,
277 Wis. 2d 303, 1[ J9, 691 N.W.2d 334, ~ 19; R epublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. First Wis. Nat'l
Bank, 636 F. upp. 1470, 1474 (E.D. Wi . 1986); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wi.. 2d 502, 515,
486 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1991).
119. Finch, 2004 WI App 110, 'l[ 23, 274 Wis. 2d 719, 9! 23, 685 N.W.2d 154, 9[ 23 .
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 196 (1981).
121. Matas, 193 Wis. at 534,214 N.W. at 333.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1668 (2006) (certain contracts unlawful).
123. Merzin v. Provident Fin. Group Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
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accomplish directly through contract by a disclaimer or exculpatory
clause. Disclaimers and exculpatory clauses for intentional torts are
against public policy. The narrow exception, which provides the same
tort immunity for fraud interwoven with the contract, is similarly against
public policy.
D. Contract Principles Summary

The narrow exception conflicts with established contract principles
in a number of ways. First, in the case of as is clauses in contracts, any
fraud or deceit practiced has always taken precedence over such a
clause. The fraudulent seller is not permitted to hide behind such a
clause, albeit freely and fairly negotiated for likely a lower sales price.
The deceit has always been redressed through a tort action. The court's
focus has not been to require the buyer to protect himself through the
contract. Rather, the court's approach has been to punish the tortfeasor
and deter him or her and others who might consider using such
misconduct in the future.
Second, the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule was created
so that the parol evidence rule would not be used to perpetrate frauds
by excluding evidence of one's fraud. Evidence of fraud has always
been admissible, despite a written contract that contained an integration
clause. Once admitted, the fraudulent conduct has always been
actionable under tort law. The narrow exception to the economic loss
doctrine, however, conflicts with the policy supporting the creation of
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. Extrinsic evidence of
interwoven fraud that would be admitted under the parol evidence rule
to avoid perpetrating a fraud is not actionable as tortious conduct under
the narrow exception. Only contract remedies are available.
Finally, contract law generally tolerates an exculpatory clause in a
contract that exculpates a party for his or her negligent conduct. On the
other hand, contract law has never permitted an exculpatory clause to
exculpate one from one's responsibility for intentional misconduct. This
has always been prohibited as against public policy. The narrow
exception's prohibition against tort liability for intentional misconduct
does indirectly what cannot be done directly in the contra t. The
narrow exception exculpates one from tort responsibility if th deceit is
considered to be interwoven fraud. In sum, the narrow exception
conflicts with established contract principles and i not sound public
policy.
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VIII. TORT PRINCIPLES AND FRAUD
A. Promissory Fraud

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss
doctrine eliminates the tort of promissory fraud committed in
conjunctj n with a contract for the sale of a product. A contract is a
promise or set of promises tbar upon breach the law gives a remedy. m
A conlractual promise carries with it the imp.lied assertion of the
promi or s intent to perform the promise. 115 If a contractual promise is
made without such intent a fraudulent misrepresentation has occurred
The person misled by the fraudulent
that is actionable. 126
misrepresentation "has a cause of action in tort as an alternative ... and
perhaps in some instances in addition to his [or her] cause of action on
the con tract." 127
Wisconsin first recognized the tort of promissory fraud in 1938. 128
Since 1938, on at least two other occasions the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has recognized that when a promisor ha no intent to perform its
contractual promise at the time of contracting, an actionable tort has
129
occurred. Promissory fraud is similar to fraud in the inducement. At
the time of contracting under promissory fraud, the innocent party is
induced to enter into the contract by the false promises of the tortfeasor.
The promises made by the tortfeasor are false because the promisor has
no intention to fulfill them. Similarly, for fraud in the inducement, at
the time of contracting, the innocent party is induced to enter into the
contract by the false promises of the tortfeasor. Under both doctrines,
there is fraudulent inducement, and for promissory fraud, the innocent
party has a tort action against the tortfeasor. Certainly all the fraud in
promissory fraud is interwoven fraud since it is the contractual promises
themselves that are the subject matter of the fraud. Further, it is likely
that in virtually all promissory fraud cases, the damages will be
economic loss, not personal injury or other property damage. Thus,
with the exception of service contracts, 130 nearly seventy years of
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 530 cmt. c (1977).
126. ld. § 530.
127. ld. § 530 cmt c.
128. Alropa Corp. v. Flatley, 226 Wis. 561 , 565-66, 277 N.W. 108, 110 (1938).
129. Hartwig v. Bitter, 29 Wis. 2d 653, 656-58, 139 N.W.2d 644, 646-48 (1966); Anderson
v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 463, 67 N.W.2d 853, 858 (1955) .
130. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 9l 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 9[52, 688
N.W.2d 462, 'j[ 52; see Hartwig, 29 Wis. 2d at 655, 658-59, 139 N.W.2d at 648.
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Wisconsin precedent are reversed by the narrow exception to the
economic loss doctrine.
B. Fraud in the Factum/Execution

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss
doctrine likely eliminates the tort of fraud in the factum (al o referred to
as fraud in the execution) committed in conjunction with a contract for
the ale of a product. The narrow exception mandate that fraud
interwoven with the contract or involving the performance of the
contract be addressed through contract remedies, not tort. Only fraud
extraneous to the contract permits the use of tort remedies. Fraud in
the factum/execution is fraud that occur "when a legal instrument as
actually executed differs from the one intended for execution. ' 131 The
fraud occur because one party procures a party's signature to a contract
without that party's knowledge of the true nature of the contract. 131 The
misrepre e.ntation is "to the character or essential terms of a proposed
contract." 133 The remedy for fraud in the factum/execution is that no
contract is formed. Punitive damages are often imposed for such fraud
becau e of the egregious breach of public policy. 134
Fraud in the inducement occurs "when a misrepresentation leads
another to enter into a transaction with a false impression of the risks,
duties, or obligation involved." 135 Fraud in the factum/execution is
actually a different kind of fraudulent inducement. Rather than
fraudulently misrepresenting the ri ks, duties, or obligations, the
tortfeasor mi represent the nature of the contract. The nature of the
contract is clearly b·aud that is interwoven with the contract or involve
the contract s performance. Under the narrow exception, thi type of
fraud would be actionable only through contract remedies. The tort of
fraud in the factum/execution is arguably eliminated by the narrow
exception.
C. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Enter into a Contract
The narrow exception's directive that interwoven fraud is not
actionable in tort fails to recognize the independent, public wrong

131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004).
132. See id.; see also Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224,
N .W.2d 944, 'I! 43.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 163 cmt a (1981).
134. Rodriguez v. Horton, 622 P.2d 261, 265 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
135. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004).

'I! 43, 725
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committed by the seller's deceitful conduct. One who "intentionally and
improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation"
by inducing a third person not to enter into a contract has committed an
actionable tort. 136 This is a statement of public policy. The tort
specifically covers the same "products" that are the domain of the
economic loss doctrine. 137 The interference with another's prospective
contractual relations must be an improper one. "The nature of the
actor's conduct is a chief factor in determining whether the conduct is
improper .... " 138 An improper interference is specifically defined as
one characterized by fraudulent misrepresentation. 139 One has a public
duty not to fraudulently interfere with another's prospective contractual
relations. There is no contract between the prospective parties, yet a
societal duty is imposed on a predatory third party. The fraud is not
tolerated in anticipation of the two parties contracting. Thus, it is clear
that fraud is punishable as a tort even without contractual relations and
in fact in anticipation of contractual relations. The harm is the
intentional interference. The prospective contractual event is the
occasion for the commission of the tort. The tort is the intentional
interference that is separate and independent of the prospective
contract. The societal duty is not to interfere with another's prospective
contractual relations.
One who breaches that societal duty by
fraudulent conduct has committed an actionable tort independent of the
prospective contractual relations.

D. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Perform a Contract
The narrow exception's directive that interwoven fraud is not
actionable in tort fails to recognize the public wrong committed by the
tortfeasor's deceitful conduct, which is independent of a companion
breach of contract action. Tort and contract law also intersect when one
party intentionally and improperly induces another not to perform his or
her contract. This is also tortious conduct. 140 There is a general duty in
society not to intentionally interfere with another's reasonable business
•
141
The mter
.
f erence must also b e an Improper
.
expectations.
one. 142
Historically, fraud has been identified as one of the means of improper
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 766B (1979).
!d. § 766B cmt. c.
!d. § 767 cmt. c.
See id.
!d. § 766.
Id. § 766 cmt. b.
!d. § 766 cmt. c.
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interference. 143 The tortious interferences are often by inducement 144
145
and predatory in nature.
The fact that the plaintiff has a cause of
action for breach of contract does not preclude the plaintiff from
maintaining a tort action against the tortfeasor. 146
Wisconsin has adopted this formulation of tortious interference with
contract. 147 The use of fraudulent misrepresentation to induce a breach
148
of contract is a wrong against the public.
The harm is the intentional
interference, which includes fraud. The contract between the parties is
the occasion for the tort. The tort is the intentional interference, which
is separate and independent from the contract. The public duty is
independent from the contract, which contains the private duties. The
tortfeasor's fraudulent conduct violates the societal duty not to
intentionally interfere with another's business relations, and thus it is
actionable as a tort. The tortfeasor's conduct must be punished to deter
such future conduct even though the aggrieved party has a companion
breach of contract action. Public policy demands such predatory
practices be addressed through tort remedies even though the aggrieved
party has a breach of contract action against the breaching party.

E. Duress
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception's directive that
interwoven fraud is not actionable in tort contradicts well-established
tort law that requires equally culpable conduct be treated in the same
manner. Duress is "any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free
will of a party." 149 Under tort law, one who forces another into a
contractual relationship as a result of an improper threaeso is subject to
liability. 151 There is generally a duty among members of society not to
forcibly cause another to enter into a contract. Duress is the breach of
143. !d. § 766.
144. !d. § 766 cmt. k.
145. ld. § 766 cmt. c.
146. ld. § 766 cmt. v.
147. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 218-21, 249
N.W.2d 547, 553-54 (1977); Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'! Farmers Org., 64 Wis. 2d 241,
257-58, 219 N.W.2d 564, 572-73 (1974).
148. Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'! Farmers Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 804, 280 N.W.2d 691,
702 (1979).
149. BLACK'S LAW DIRECTORY 542 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting JOHN D. CALAMARI &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 9-2, at 337 (3d ed. 1987)).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 cmt. f (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS§ 176 (1981).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 (1979).
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that duty. One who by duress forces another into a contract is subject to
resciSSion of the contract, 152 compensatory damages, and punitive
damages. 153
Wisconsin recognizes all forms of duress, including
business, economic, and physical duress. 154 Wisconsin also recognizes
that punitive damages are available when one uses duress to force
155
another into a contractual relationship.
Under tort law, duress is considered a specie of fraud in which the
compulsion takes the place of deceit in causing the injury. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses duress and fraud in the same
section. "One who intentionally deprives another of [a] legally
protected property interest ... is subject to liability ... if [the] conduct is
generally culpable .... " 156 Both fraud 157 and duress 158 are considered to
be equally culpable conduct. Both fraud in the inducement and duress
cause the creation of a contract. The only difference is the nature of the
culpable conduct. Both, however, are tortious. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that the remedies for the tort of duress and
the tort of fraud are the same. 159 Punitive damages are available for
160
both fraud and duress under the Restatement (Second) of Torts. As a
matter of public policy, should there be a difference between cases
where one forcibly or fraudulently causes another to enter into a
contract? Duress and fraud are torts that both wrongfully induce the
formation of a contract. They are equal wrongs of societal duties and
are recognized as coincident torts. 161 There are no exceptions for any
kind of conduct that involves duress. There is no exception for
interwoven terms that limit an aggrieved party to solely contract
remedies. The breach of duty and societal wrong is independent of the
contractual relationship. The contract is simply the occasion for the
tort. An aggrieved person who suffers duress has the full range of tort
remedies to address the grievous conduct. On the other hand, one who
suffers from deceitful conduct that is interwoven with the contract has

152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175 (1981).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 cmt. f, illus. 5 (1979) .
154. Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 494, 101 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1960).
155. Frankard v. Amoco Oil Co., 116 Wis. 2d 254, 267-68, 342 N .W.2d 247, 253 (Ct.
App. 1983).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 (1979).
157. Id. § 871 cmt. e.
158. ld. § 871 cmt. f.
159. ld.
160. See generally id. § 870.
161. Compare id. § 871 cmt. e, with id. § 871 cmt. f.
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no tort remedies tmder the narrow exception to the economic loss
doctrine. There should be no exception for fraudulent conduct. The
fraud require · independent redres as all torts require, in order to
promote the public good. The narrow exception clearly contradicts
well-establi bed law and doe not promote the public good.
F. Conversion by Acting Beyond the Scope of the Contract

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception creates immunity for
interwoven fraud that cannot be justified by compari on to a parallel
situation that also involve an intentional tort that con titutes a breach
of contract. A "[c]onversion is an intentional exerci e of dominion or
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of
an ther.' 162 A negligent interference is not sufficient to be conver i n;
163
it must be intentional. There are a number of way to commit th e tort
of conver ion. One particular mean is where a person "is authorized to
make a particular use of a chattel and uses it in a manner exceeding the
authorization. ' 1 The actor i liable for conversion. This type of
conversion frequently arises in case of a bailment eontract.'165 In
e sence, the gravamen of this tort is an unauthorized u e that exceed
the limit of the authorization, o as to constitute a material breach of
the contract. The unauthorized use is a clear breach of the contract, and
it also con titutes the tort of conversion. The aggrieved party has a
claim in both contract and tort.
Wisconsin ca e law ha accepted the principle that an unaut11orized
use beyond the limits of a contract' authorization is a conversion. 166 In
Heinen v. Home Mutual Casualty Co. a dealer's sale of a mobile home
in a manner contrary to the partie ' contract was held to be a
conversion. '67 Despite the fact that the improper sale was a material
breach of the contract, tbe court also recognized the intentional tort. 168
The analysis for an unauthorized use that exceeds the parameters of the
parties contract is virtually identical to the situation that arises from
fraudulently inducing one to enter into a contract. In both situations a
material breach of the contract ba occurred. In both situation a

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 222A(1) (1965).
!d. § 224.
!d. § 228.
!d. § 228 cmt. a.
Heinen v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 92 N.W.2d 836, 840 (1958).
!d., 92 N.W.2d at 840.
ld. at 290, 92 N.W.2d at 840.
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eparately identifiable tort has also occurred. In the ca e of the
conversion, the aggrieved party has an actionable tort claim,
notwitb ·tanding a pru·allel breach of contract claim. In the case of the
.fr audulent inducement, there is an actionable fraud claim only if the
fraud relate to an extraneous matter to the contract. For fraud that
relate to the terms of the contract or the contracts performance no
tort i actionable under the narrow exception. This di parate treatment
crumot be justified. Surely, deceitful conduct that induce a contract is
as reprehensible a a matter of public policy as exceeding a contractually
authorized use. Further, the unauthorized use i by definition a dispute
that relates to an interwoven term over which the parties negotiated.
Should the courts create an interwoven exception for thi tortiou
conduct as well? The answer is "no." There should be no exception for
tortiou conduct in either situation.
G. Punitive Damages

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception bas a devastating
impact on the award of punitive damages in a number of significant
ways. Fir t, it defeats two of the primary purpo es of punitive damage .
Second the narrow exception create a judicial exception to the
Wisconsin statute authorizing punitive damage where none exist .
Third, the narrow exception opens the door to reprehensible conduct
that in the recent past has been appropriately redressed by Wisconsin
courts.
Pursuant to Wisconsin tatutes, punitive damages may be awarded
where one party has acted in intentional disregard of the right o the
other party. ~~~'' ' A per on act in an intentional di regard of the right of
[another] if the person act with the purpose to disregard the other' ]
rights, or is aware that hi or her act are substantially eertain tore ult in
the plaintiff's rights being di regarded.' 170 For a court to find an
intentional eli regard of the right of the other party the actor's conduct
mu t be: (1) deliberate· (2) an actual di regard of the other' property
right; and (3) ufficiently aggravated to warrant puni hment. m "The
purpose of punitive damages is to punish ... or deter the wrongdoer and
others from engaging in similar conduct in thefuture.'' 172 The amount of
punitive damages awarded is sucb a sum as will accomplish the dual

r

169. WIS. STAT.§ 895.043(3) (2005-2006).
170. Wis. JI-Civil1707.1 (2007) (punitive damages: non-product liability) .
171. Id.
172. Id.

2007]

ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE

949

purposes of punishment and deteiTence."l Significantly, the deterrence
purpo e i to deter the current tortfeasor and others from committing
the offending conduct. Punitive damages are rarely available in a
breach of contract action. In fact punitive damage are only available in
a contract action when ' the breach is also a tor t for which punitive
damage are recoverable. " ~ In other word , despite tbe fact that a
breach of contract has occmTed, when there i an independent tort,
punitive damages are available. This is the o-called tort exception to
the contract rule. 175
Intentiona l misrepresentation via fraudulent inducement i an
intentional tort that satisfie the tort exception permitting punitive
damage , albeit there is also a breach of contract. Historically both the
breach of contract and independent tort were recognized and
appropriate damages a sessed. A party's intentional misrepre entation
that induces the making of a contract gives the aggrieved party the
power to avoid the contract. 176 It al o give the aggrieved party a claim
for damages in tort. 117 The narrow exception to the economic loss
doctrine, however fundamentally changes th:is principle. The narrow
exception provides that if the intentional mi repre entation relates to a
matter that is interwoven with the contract, no independent cause of
action in tort is available. 178 Without the independent tort, no punitive
damages can be awarded.
Fmther, the adoption of the narrow exception reverses many years
of well-established and ound Wisconsin jurisprudence regarding
fraudulent inducement. For example, in Lundin v. Shimanski,119 the
eller of a rental property 180 fraudulently induced the buyer to enter into
a purchase contract by falsely representing that the property was
capable of being rented for income production and that the basement
17

173. /d.
174. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 355 (1981).
175. /d. § 355 cmt b.
176. /d. § 164.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 525 (1977).
178. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, 'l!42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'll 42,
699 N.W.2d 205, 'l!42.
179. 124 Wis. 2d 175,368 N.W.2d 676 (1985).
180. A rental property likely qualifies as a "product" since the construction of a home,
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 'l!25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'l!25, 699 N.W.2d 189, 'l!25,
and a 42-unit condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI
94, 'l!67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'l!67, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'I! 67, are "products" under the economic loss
doctrine.
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was capable of being occupied. 181 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had no
difficulty in finding the seller's conduct evidenced a reckless disregard
for the buyer's rights, and it affirmed an award of punitive damages
against the seller. Significantly, the court noted:
Punitive damages are awarded to punish wrongdoing.
To hold that punitive damages are improper in this case
would shield the defendants from any liability beyond
the costs of compensating the [plaintiffs] for their costs in
putting the house in the condition it was represented to
be in originally. But "putting the cookies back in the jar"
when caught is not enough. If that result were reached,
sellers could make any misrepresentation necessary to
make a sale. If it was not discovered, or was discovered
but not pursued, the seller would make a windfall gain.
If the fraud were discovered and successfully proven, the
seller would only be liable to make good on his
representations. He would suffer no punishment nor
would he be deterred from similar conduct in the
future. 182
The fraudulent inducement in Lundin related to matters that were
clearly interwoven as that term is described in the narrow exception.
Thus, the fraud in the Lundin case would not be punished or deterred
under the narrow exception. The narrow exception creates the very
situation that the Supreme Court intended to avoid.
In Jeffers v. Nysse, 183 the seller fraudulently induced the buyers to
enter into a purchase contract by knowingly misrepresenting the
insulation and heating costs for a home 184 to be constructed by the
sellers. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that when a party's
motive of self-interest rises to the level of disregarding the rights of
another, punitive damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoing. 185
Significantly, the court noted that to not allow punitive damages in a
case like Jeffers "would shield the defendants from any liability beyond
the costs of compensating the [buyers] for their costs in putting the
181. Lundin, 124 Wis. 2d at 178-81,368 N.W.2d at 678-79.
182. Id. at 198-99, 368 N.W.2d at 687 (quoting Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 553, 297
N.W.2d 495, 499 (1980)).
183. 98 Wis. 2d at 544-46, 297 N.W.2d at 495-96.
184. A contract for the construction of a new home is a "product" under the economic
loss doctrine. Linden, 2005 WI 113, 'J[25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'J[25, 699 N.W.2d 189, 'J[25.
185. Jeffers, 98 Wis. 2d at 551, 297 N.W.2d at 498-99.
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house in the condition it was represented to be in originally. lllf> The
court indicated that such a remedy would be an in ufficient remedy and
affirmed the punitive damage award. The court could find no logical
basis for applying a different punitive damage standard in a ca e of
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract than that applied in other
intentional tort action . 1117 The fraud in Jeffers clearly related to matters
interwoven to the contract and thus the independent tort would not be
recognized under the narrow exception. Requiring the buyer to
anticipate fraud and to a sume, allocate or insure again t it i focusing
on the wrong party to the contract and it is certainly not a ufficient
basis for applying a different punitive damage standard for ca es of
fraudulent inducement than that applied in other ca e of intentional
torts.
In Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc. 188 a milk farmer entered into a
contract to sell the farmer's entire output of milk189 to Kraft Food . The
case was tried before an arbitrator applying Wisconsin law. The
arbitrator found that Kraft's agent intentionally misrepresented to the
farmer that they could get out of the contract at any time by paying one
month's penalty. The farmers indicated that Kraft s agent "lied to get us
to ign." 190
The arbitrator determined that Kraft intentionally
disregarded the farmers' rights and awarded punitive damages against
Kraft. On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the arbitrator's award of
191
punitive damages.
Unquestionably the fraudulent inducement
concerned the farmer ' ability to terminate the contract, which is a term
that would be interwoven under the narrow exception. Thus the
intentional tort would not be actionable, and no punitive damages
would be awarded for the agent's lies.
193
In Rowell v. Ash/ 92 the seller of a mobile home park concealed
defects in the park's septic and well system. The trial court refused to
186. Id. at 553, 297 N.W.2d at 499.
187. Id. at 551, 297 N.W.2d at 499.
188. 2005 WI App 25, 'll 2, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 'J[2, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'll 2.
189. This is an output contract under Wisconsin Statutes section 402.306, and the
tran action i covered by the U.C.C.
190. Winkelman, 2005 WI App 25, ~ 3, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 'll 3, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'll 3.
191. ld. II 1 279 Wis. 2d 335,11, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'lll.
192. No. 98-2904-FT, 1999 WL 326205 (Wi . Ct. App. May 25, 1999).
193. A mobile home park llkely qualifies as a "product" since the con truction of a
home, Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, Cf 25, 283 Wi . 2d 606 i 25, 699 N.W.2d
189, Cf 25, and a 42-unil condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group Ltd.,
2006 WI 94, 'j{ 67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, Cjl67, 716 N.W.2c.I 822, 'j{ 67. are "products" under the
economic loss doctrine.
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submit the buyers' claim for punitive damages to the jury. 194 On appeal,
the court of appeals held that the buyers were entitled to a new trial on
the issue of punitive damages. The appeals court noted that a jury
question was fairly presented whether the sellers intentionally
disregarded the buyers' rights. 195
The buyers asserted that the
concealment of the defective well and septic system induced the sales
contract and thereby disregarded their rights. 196 The state of the mobile
home park's well and septic system was clearly interwoven with the sale
of the park. Thus, under the narrow exception only the breach of
contract action is available, and no jury question is presented for
punitive damages.
In Sassara v. Braun, 197 a buyer purchased a plane 198 upon the seller's
"representations that the plane had an airworthiness certificate and a
fresh annual inspection." Both representations were knowingly false.
The buyer brought an action to rescind the contract because of the
intentional misrepresentation and also sought punitive damages. The
court noted that although punitive damages are not available in a breach
of contract action, they are available if the defendant has committed a
tort and a breach of contract. 199 The court characterized the buyer's case
as a fraud case seeking the remedy of rescission. In the court's opinion,
this was not a straight breach of contract case. The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's damage award, which rescinded the contract;
returned the purchase price, plus prejudgment interest; awarded
incidental expenses; and awarded punitive damages for the seller's
fraudulent inducement. 200 Under the narrow exception to the economic
loss doctrine, no tort would be recognized for the seller's lies regarding
the plane's airworthiness and current annual inspection. Both items are
interwoven with the contract, and thus no independent tort is
available. 201
194. Rowell, 1999 WL 326205, at *2.
195. !d. at *6.
196. /d. at *1-2. See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 30-31, 288 N.W.2d 95,
102 (1980); Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '1[13, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '1[13,
699 N.W.2d 205, '1[13 (finding that failing to satisfy a duty to disclose serves as a basis for a
fraudulent inducement to contract claim).
197. No. 95-3300, 1997 WL 164020, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1997).
198. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly the sale of a "product" under the economic loss
doctrine.
199. Sassara, 1997 WL 164020, at *5.
200. !d. at *1-2.
201. One could argue the "public safety" exception to the economic loss doctrine, but
that exception has not been expanded beyond the use of asbestos in a shopping center. See
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The narrow exception, by limiting a defrauded party to olely its
contract remedy, provides little di incentive to an unscrupul us party.
In Radford v. J.J.B. Enterprises) Ltd. 202 two buyers pW'chased a boaecll
that subsequently leaked due to dry rot in the boat's bull. The jury
found that the seller intentionally misrepresented the oundness of the
boat's hull prior to the sale.2().1 The seller represented to the buyers that
all the dry rot was removed from the hull, and it wa ound and
seaworthy. The court noted that '[i]t [wa ] hard to imagine a
repre entation more important to a prospective boat owner than
soundnes of the boat s bull. ,lOS The seller s tatements about the boat's
hull concerned the fundamental element that makes a boat a boat. The
jury found that the sellers fraudulently induced the buyers to purchase
the boat and awarded compensatory and punitive damage . The court
of appeals confirmed the damage awards.2()(i Under the narrow
exception to the economic los doctrine, the soundness of the hull would
certainly be a matter interwoven with the contract. 207 As such, the tort is
not actionable and no punitive damage would be available to deter thi
boat seller or others from lying in the future.
In Smith v. Adcock,2fJ8 a buyer was induced to purchase a 50%
interest in a horse 209 by fraudul ent misrepresentations by the seller. The
misrepresentations concerned the timing and terms of reselling the
horse. Upon a finding of fraudulent inducement the jury assessed
$25,000 in punitive damages against the seller. 210 Under the narrow
exception the seller's fraud arguably related to matters interwoven with
the contract and thus it is not actionable in tort. No punitive damages
would be asses ed for the seUer' fraud or to deter other seller .

Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 922, 937-38, 471 N.W.2d 179, 180, 186
(1991).
202. 163 Wis. 2d 534, 541, 472 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Ct. App. 1991).
203. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly a sale of a "product" under the economic loss
doctrine.
204. Radford, 163 Wis. 2d at 539, 472 N.W.2d at 792.
205. Id. at 544, 472 N.W.2d at 794.
206. !d. at 548-59, 472 N.W.2d at 796.
207. One could argue the "public safety' exception to the economic loss doctrine, but
that exception has not been expanded beyond the use of asbestos in a shopping center. See
Northridge Co., 162 Wis. 2d at 922. 937- 38, 471 N.W.2d at 180, 186.
208. Smith v. Adcock, No. 87-0088, 1987 WL 29666, at *1, *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
1987).
209. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly a sale of a "product" under the economic loss
doctrine.
210. Smith, 1987 WL 29666, at *2.
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Finally, in Spore v. Woodley, 211 buyers purchased a resore from the
sellers based on the sellers' representations regarding the resort's gross
revenues. Subsequent to the sale, it was determined that the amount of
gros revenues stated by the seller was false. The buyers sought
re ci ion for the intentional mi representation and punitive damages.
The trial court granted rescis ion of the contract and awarded restitution
of monies paid by the buyer ; prejudgment interest on the monies paid;
incidental damages; and punitive damage . On appeal the court
affirmed the award of punitive damages for the intentional
Eraudulently
misrepresentation committed by the sellers. 113
misrepresenting the amount of gross revenues was one of the essential
terms relied upon by the buyer that induced the buyer to purchase the
re ort. It was clearly interwoven with the contract negotiations.
Nevertheless, under the narrow exception, the tort is not actionable, and
the buyer has only contract damages available. No punitive damages
are available.
The simplest analysis of the impact of the narrow exception to the
economic loss doctrine on the award of punitive damages reflects that it
is not sound public policy for a number of reasons. First, the narrow
exception defeats two of the primary purposes of punitive damages,
which are to punish and deter a deceitful tortfeasor and to deter others
from using deceit in contract negotiations. The narrow exception
ignores the tort in cases of fraud that are interwoven with the contract's
formation. Thus, no punitive damages are available. Second, Wisconsin
statutes authorize punitive damages where one party intentionally
disregards the rights of another. There is no statutory exception for
intentionally interfering with another s rights where the tort is fraud that
is interwoven with a contract's formation. The narrow exception is a
judicially created exception to a legislative enactment that has no
exceptions. In addition, in 1995, when the punitive damage statute was
passed, the supreme court had already upheld the award of punitive
214
If the
damages in the preceding fraudulent inducement cases.

211. No. 85-0874, 1986 WL 217380 (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 1986).
212. A resort likely qualifies as a "product" since the construction of a home, Linden v.
Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, !][ 25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, !][ 25, 699 N.W.2d 189, !][ 25, and the
sale of a 42-unit condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006
WI 94, !][ 67,293 Wis. 2d 410, !][ 67, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'J[ 67, are "products" under the economic
loss doctrine.
213. Spore, 1986 WL 217380, at *2.
214. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text (discussing supreme court decisions
on punitive damages).
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legislature had intended to reverse those award by creating an
exception, it would have done so. It did not. The inference is clear that
no exceptions to the punitive damage statute should exi t.
Finally, many years of Wisconsin jurisprudence bave recognized the
tort when one fraudulently induced another t enter into a contract with
lies and deceit. The conduct has always been punished by punitive
damages. Unfortunately, the adoption of the narrow exception reverses
many years of well-established and sound Wisconsin jurisprudence
regarding fraudulent inducement.
H. The Duty of Honesty and Fair Dealing

Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of honesty 215 and fair
dealing. 216 A tort approach rather than a contract approach most
effectively promotes this public policy of honesty and fair dealing
between contracting parties.
Oftentimes, a breach of a contract duty and tort duty will overlap.
"Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort, but a contract may create
the state of things which furnishes the occasion of a tort. " 211 For
example, "[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to
perform with care, skill, [and] reasonable expedience" the contractual
218
duties. A negligent failure to perform such duties i a tort as well as a
19
breach of contrace Under such circumstances the aggrieved party has
a cause of action in both contract and tort and can often choose between
the two. 220 The economic loss doctrine, however, provides that a tort
cause of action is not available if the breach of duty has caused only
economic loss. The societal interest in the duty to perform the contract
duties is not significant enough to permit a tort cause of action that
ignores the contract terms. The contract remedy is the only remedy
available.
215 . The actual duty stated is "good faith and fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Honesty and good faith are interchangeable, thus the duty of
honesty and fair dealing. /d. § 205 cmt. a.
216. Specifically, the Restatement provides this duty in the performance and
enforcement of the contract, not at formation. ld. § 205 cmts. a, b. However, the Wiscon in
Supreme Court has recognized this duty at formation in Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis.
2d 17, 50-51, 288 N. W.2d 95, 111 (1980), and Kaloti Enterprises., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co.,
2005 Wt 111, ~ 20,283 Wis. 2d 555, <i 20, 699 N.W.2d 205,lf 20.
217. Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 146,47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (quoting 38 AM.
JUR. Negligence§ 20 (1941)).
218. ld., 47 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting 38 AM. JUR. Negligence§ 20 (1941)).
219. Brooks v. Hayes,133 Wis. 2d 228, 235,395 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1986).
220. ld. at 246, 395 N.W.2d at 174.
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A more difficult problem arises, however, when a contracting party
is fraudulently induced to enter into a contract. The contractual duties
arising from the contract exist. The societal duty to perform the
contractual duties with reasonable care also exists. But, with the
fraudulent inducement, an additional societal duty is breached.
Wisconsin has a deeply rooted history in requiring honesty and fair
dealing between contracting parties. 221 The duty protects the public
interest in "formulating business judgments without being misled by
others-that is, the interest in not being cheated. " 222 The societal duty
to promote honesty and fair dealing in contractual relations includes the
duty not to lie and a duty to disclose material facts in certain
223
circumstances.
Thus, the issue becomes whether the economic loss
doctrine should still apply in the face of a party's fraudulent inducement.
The narrow exception adopted in Kaloti provides that contract law
shall control the parties' dispute, despite one party's deceitful conduct,
provided the fraud relates to matters interwoven with the contract. On
the other hand, if the fraud relates to extraneous matters, then tort
remedies are available. In most cases of fraud in the inducement, the
fraud will relate to an interwoven matter. 224 In such cases, the contract
remedies are the only ones available, not tort remedies. Thus, the
societal duty to promote honesty and fair dealing is ignored. There is no
price paid by the tortfeasor for his or her deceit. There is no message
sent to others similarly situated to deter them from perpetrating
fraudulent conduct. The predatory practices can continue, and the
tortfeasor's greatest exposure is to pay damages for the difference
between the product's actual value and the value as fraudulently
225
represented.
There is no exposure to punitive damages to punish the
tortfeasor for his or her repugnant conduct. There is no punitive
damage message to deter others from committing such predatory
practices. In fact, the societal concern is completely ignored by adopting
the narrow exception unless the fraud is found to be extraneous.
The rationale supporting the narrow exception is that the aggrieved
party should negotiate his or her protection in the contract. There are,
however, shortcomings to that rationale. First, should parties in a
221.
'![ 47, 283
222.
223.
'![ 20.
224.
225.

Ollerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 50-51, 288 N.W.2d at 111; Kaloti Enters., Inc., 2005 WI 111,
Wis. 2d 555, '![ 47, 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 47.
0/lerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 30,288 N.W .2d at 101.
See Kaloti Enters., Inc. , 2005 WI 111, '![ 20, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 20, 699 N.W.2d 205,
See discussion supra Part VI (identifying the rare cases of extraneous fraud).
Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 195,368 N.W.2d 676, 686 (1985).

:
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contract negotiation expect honesty and fair dealing from the other
party, or expect fraud? The better policy would be to expect and
encourage honesty and fair dealing, not fraud. Second, even if one party
anticipates all the protection available by contract and negotiates
contract warranty protection from fraud, the only remedy available to
the aggrieved party in the event of fraud is the breach of contract action.
Is it likely that the parties' negotiations will include a contract clause
that makes punitive damages available in the event one party commits
fraud? I think not. Further, should the promotion of such an important
public policy be left to private contracting parties, or is this a matter best
left to tort law to promote the societal interest? It seems clear that the
public policy to promote honesty and fair dealings is most effectively
promoted by a tort approach rather than a contract approach. The
Wisconsin Statutes and Department of Agriculture, Trade, and
Consumer Protection ("DATCP") regulations that redress falsely
induced contracts use the tort approach, not the contract approach. 226
The legislative approach uses the threat of costs and punitive damages
to deter falsely induced contracts and to promote honesty and fair
dealing between contracting parties. There is no exception for any kind
of fraudulently induced contract. The legislature has chosen the tort
approach to effectuate the duty of honesty and fair dealing. The courts
should use the same approach.
I. Tort Principles Summary

The narrow exception clearly conflicts with established tort
principles. First, a number of torts may be completely eliminated by the
narrow exception. Promissory fraud is a tort that occurs when a
promisor has no intent to perform a contractual promise at the time of
contracting. It has been recognized in Wisconsin for seventy years. The
narrow exception eliminates the tort of promissory fraud because a tort
claim cannot be asserted for interwoven fraud. Since promissory fraud
is fraud that relates to the actual promises in the contract, it is, by
definition, interwoven fraud, not extraneous fraud. Any tort action
under the narrow exception for interwoven fraud can only be brought as
a contract action. Thus, the tort of promissory fraud has been
eliminated.
Also, fraud in the factum/execution occurs when one misrepresents
the character or nature of a contract and procures another's signature to
it. Fraud in the factum/execution has always been recognized as a
226. See infra Part IX.
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breach of one's public duty and a tort. The fraud relates to the
character or nature of the contract and, as such, is the epitome of an
interwoven term. Thus, under the narrow exception the tort claim is
barred.
Second, there are a number of torts that are actionable because the
societal wrong committed is separate and independent from the contract
or prospective contractual relations. The contract is simply the occasion
for the tort. The narrow exception fails to recognize this principle. For
example fraudulently inducing one not to enter into a contract or to
perform one's contract is actionable as a tort despite the contractual
background. Similarly, duress and fraud are actionable torts that both
procure the creation of a cont:ract. The contract is the occasion for the
tort. A contract is formed under both circumstances. But there are two
independent wrongs committed in the contracting process. One is fraud,
and the other is compulsion. Tort law treats them as equal wrongs and
actionable as such. The narrow exception precludes the tort action for
interwoven fraud and thereby fails to recognize the deceit as a wrong
independent from the contract. This is a significant failure of the
exception.
Third, the narrow exception provides disparate treatment to parallel
tort situations. The intentional tort of conversion occurs when the
bailee in a bailment contract exceeds the authorized level of use
specified in the contract. The unauthorized use is a material breach of
contract. The unauthorized use is also a conversion under tort law.
Similar to the situation of fraudulent inducement, the fraudulent
inducement is a material breach of contract and also an intentional tort.
In the bailment situation, the tort is actionable despite the companion
breach of contract action. Under the narrow exception, the fraudulent
inducement is not actionable if the fraud relates to interwoven terms.
These are parallel situations that are treated differently under the law.
Surely the deceitful conduct is a greater societal wrong than exceeding
the authorized use in the contract.
Fourth, the narrow exception seriously undercuts the availability,
purpose, and power of punitive damages. The victims of deceitful
conduct are granted the right by statute to pursue punitive damages
upon satisfying the statute's requirements. 227 The narrow exception, by
barring tort actions for interwoven fraud, is a judicially created
exception to the punitive damage statute, where no exceptions were
authorized by the statute. Further, the narrow exception, by not
227. WIS. STAT.§ 895.043 (2005-2006).
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permitting a tort action for interwoven fraud, defeats two of the primary
purposes for punitive damages. It fails to punish and deter the
tortfeasor, and it fails to deter others from engaging in fraudulent
conduct in the future. Finally, and perhaps most distressing, the narrow
exception prevents the assessment of punitive damages in many cases of
egregious deceit that have been justifiably punished for many years in
Wisconsin courts. The litany of past fraudulent actors that will now be
able to avoid the full consequences of their deceit under the narrow
exception is simply unjust.
Fifth, Wisconsin's proud history, which requires honesty and fair
dealing between contracting parties, is not promoted by the narrow
exception. Societal duties are advanced through tort law, and private
duties are advanced through contract law. The duty of honesty and fair
dealing is a public duty that is important enough to require a tort
approach, not a contract approach. The narrow exception's insistence
on a contract approach is not sufficient to ensure maximum compliance
with the public duty of honesty and fair dealing.
IX. THESTATUTORY AND REGULATORY APPROACHTO
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT

A. Statutory Fraudulent Inducement
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception conflicts with
Wisconsin's fraudulent inducement statute. In 1995, the legislature
passed Wisconsin Statutes section 895.80, which provides that "[a]ny
person who suffers damage or loss by reason of intentional conduct that
occurs on or after November 1, 1995" and also is in violation of
Wisconsin Statutes section 943.20 228 has a statutory cause of action
against the person who caused the damage or loss. 229 One violates
section 943.20 by obtaining "title to property of another person by
intentionally deceiving the person with a false representation which is
known to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does defraud
the person to whom it is made." 230 A "'[f]alse representation' includes a
promise made with intent not to perform it if it is part of a false and
fraudulent scheme." 231 The legislature has made a decision that any
228. Wisconsin Statutes chapter 943 is "crimes against property," and section 943.20
specifically covers theft.
229. WIS. STAT. § 895.446 (2005-2006) (action for property damage or loss caused by
crime) (previously section 895.80).
230. ld. § 943.20(1)(d).
231. ld.
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person who suffers a criminal fraud in the inducement has a statutory
civil cause of action against the person who caused the damage or loss. 232
Significantly, the authorizing statute further provides that a successful
plaintiff is authorized to recover actual damages, all costs of
investigation and litigation, and exemplary damages of not more than
three times the actual damages. 233 Further, the legislature has defined
those damages that are recoverable as "actual damages," which includes
"the retail or replacement value of damaged, used, or lost property,
whichever is the greater." 234 The itemized damages are clearly economic
loss damages. 235 The legislature has also authorized exemplary damages,
which are punitive damages. 236 The punitive damages are available
without any additional proof other than that a criminal fraud in the
inducement has occurred. 237 Finally, the legislature also authorized
recovery for all the costs of any investigation and litigation, which
includes the value of time spent on the matter. 238 Obviously, the
legislature has made a significant public policy decision that criminal
fraud in the inducement authorizes a civil fraud in the inducement case.
The narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine is in direct
conflict with this legislative enactment. The narrow exception provides
that fraud in the inducement that relates to interwoven terms can only
be brought under contract law. The narrow exception clearly precludes
a statutorily authorized civil cause of action for criminal fraud in the
inducement. As such, the narrow exception is in conflict with the
authorizing statute. 239
There is only one decision addressing the conflict between the
narrow exception and the authorizing statute. In Below v. Norton, 240
buyers purchased a home after the sellers disclosed that the only
plumbing defect was a defective bathtub drain handle. Subsequently, it
was "discovered that the sewer line between the house and the street

232. Jd. § 895.446(1). There are actually seventeen separate criminal statutory sections
that, if violated, also give rise to a civil cause of action. !d.
233. Jd. § 895.446(3).
234. !d. § 895.446(3)(a).
235. See supra Part V (defining economic loss damages).
236. WIS. STAT.§ 895.446(3)(c).
237. !d.
238. !d. § 895.446 (3)(b).
239. See id. § 895.446.
240. No. 2005AP2855, 2006 Wise. App. LEXIS 1092 (Nov. 21, 2006) (awaiting
publication).
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241

was broken."
In their uit the buyers alleged a statutory fraud in the
inducement action. he court of appeals appli d tbe narrow exception
adopted in Kctloti and reasoned Lhat the fraud in the inducement wa not
242
a matter unrelated" to the contract.
A such tb · conomic I ss
doctrine barred the statutorily authorized fraud in the inducement
action. !~] Thi approach by the c urts i in direct contravention to tb
legislature's public policy decision.
" [D]etennination of pub.lic policy is a matter p1·imarily for th
legislature, and where tbe legi lature has clearly stated it policy in the
form fa statute, ... that detennination is binding on ... the courts. 24'1
'LI]L is Lhe duty of lthe] court to apply the policy the 1egislatuTe has
codified in the tatute not [to] impose [its] own policy ctJOices. " 245
Otherwise, the courts act as a super-Legislature. The enactment f the
criminal Jraucl i11 the inducement statute is a public p licy statement that
fraud in tl1e inducement is a serious matter of public concem. In fact, it
can ri e to the level of criminal activity. The commjssion of criminal
fraud in the inducement begets a statutory civil fraud in the inducement
cau e of action. Whether the fTaud wa extraneous or interwoven with
the c ntract is n · t part of the analysis. The narrow exception clearLy
conflicts with th statutory auiliorization and cannot stand.

B. Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the ec nomic los
doctrine i completely eclipsed by the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"). Chapter 100 of the Wisconsin Statutes
regulates marketing and trade practices. It is commonly refened to as
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. A significant part of the statut
d aJs directly with · ·ller fraudulently inducing contracts for various
products and services. The DTPA applies to consumer and commerciaL
transactions. Obviously, the sale of products that result in economic lo s
to the buyer would b subject to the economic lo s doctrine. be sa.le of
s rvices,:w, of cour e would not be subject to the doctrine.247 The DTPA
241. !d.
242. !d.
243. !d.
244. Sinclair v. Dep't Health & Soc. Servs., 77 Wis. 2d 322, 335, 253 N.W.2d 245, 251
(1977).
245. Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 'll 34, 267 Wis. 2d 59,
9[ 34, 671 N.W.2d 633, 9[ 34.
246. See, e.g., Wrs. STAT.§ 100.177 (2005-2006) (noting that a fitness center is a business
whose primary purpose is to provide services).
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prohibits and sanctions sellers that fraudulently induce sales of
particular products. For example, no person may make untrue,
deceptive, or misleading representations to induce a contract for the sale
250
of drugs, 248 the sale of food, 249 the sale of a vehicle product warranty,
251
or the sale of a vehicle rust-proofing warranty. For those fraudulently
induced sales not covered by a specific statutory section, there is one
section that provides very broad coverage. No person may make
"untrue, deceptive or misleading" representations to induce a contract for
the "purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real estate, merchandise,
securities, employment or services," or anything else. 252 In addition to the
express statutory prohibitions against fraudulently inducing contracts,
there are companion provisions prohibiting deceptive advertising that
may lead to the formation of a contract. 253 The statute further provides
that a person suffering pecuniary loss because of any statutory violation
may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and recover his or her
pecuniary loss, together with costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 254
This is a statutory remedy that supplements any other remedies an
aggrieved person possesses. 255
The purpose of all the statutory
prohibitions against fraudulently inducing one into a contract is to
protect the public from untrue, deceptive, or misleading
representations. 256 The DTPA is a clear statement of public policy
sanctioning sellers who fraudulently induce contracts.
The narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine provides that a
fraudulent inducement that relates to the terms and conditions of the
contract is actionable only for breach of contract. That principle directly
contradicts the DTPA mandate, which provides an independent cause
of action for any fraudulent inducement that falls within the scope of the
statute. The courts that have addressed the relationship between the
economic loss doctrine and the DTPA's statutory prohibition and
remedy have reached conflicting results. Some courts have concluded
247. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 'li 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'li 52, 688
N.W.2d 462, 'li 52.
248. WIS. STAT. § 100.182(2) (2005-2006).
249. !d. § 100.183(1).
250. ld. § 100.203.
251. Id. § 100.205(5)(a).
252. Id. § 100.18(1).
253. !d. § 100.18(2), (3), (3m), (9)(a), and (10m).
254. !d. § 100.18(11)(b)2.
255. See Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 'li'li 40-42, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 'li'J[ 40-42, 643
N.W.2d 132 'li'li 40-42.
256. Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 57, 496 N.W.2d 106, 116 (1992).

c
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that where the economic loss doctrine bars claims of common law
fraudulent inducement (interwoven fraud), the economic loss doctrine
also bars claims under the DTPA. 257 Others have concluded that the
economic loss doctrine should not bar fraudulent inducement claims
under the DTPA. 258 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet decided
the issue, although in dictum it suggested that the economic loss
doctrine may not be a bar to a claim under the DTPA .259
The weight of case authority clearly indicates that the economic loss
doctrine should not be a bar to any fraudulent inducement actions under
the DTPA whether the fraudulent inducement relates to interwoven or
extraneous matters.
The weight of authority is correct.
"[D]etermination of public policy is a matter primarily for the
legislature, and where the legislature has clearly stated its policy in the
form of a statute, ... that determination is binding on ... the courts." 260
If the supreme court and the legislature differ on public policy, the
legislature's view must control. 261 The supreme court's Kaloti decision,
adopting the principle that contracts induced by fraud on interwoven
terms can be brought only in contract, directly conflicts with the
statutory mandate of the DTPA and its companion sections. The
DTPA sections supersede the narrow exception, not vice versa. Thus,
an aggrieved party that is fraudulently induced to purchase a "product"
can sue under Wisconsin Statutes section 100.18 to recover his or her
pecuniary loss and attorneys fees despite the fact that the fraud may be
interwoven.
In addition, punitive damages are also available as part of a claim
asserted under the DTPA if the prerequisites for punitive damages are

257. MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 873, 886
(W.D . Wis. 2002); Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG Indus., No. 97-C-707-S, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22489, at *11-*15 (W.D. Wis. June 10, 1998).
258. Dow v. Poltzer, 364 F. Supp. 2d 931 , 938-39 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Seibel v. A.O. Smith
Corp., No. 97-C-0874-S, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19903, at *7, *10 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 1998);
Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1997); Peterson v.
Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, 'II 30,299 Wis. 2d 800, '1!30, 720 N.W.2d 716,
'J[30; Carlson v. Gleichsner, No. 04-1376,2005 WL 241168, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2005);
Kailin, 2002 WI App 70, 'll'Jl 42--43,252 Wis. 2d 676, 'l!'ll42--43, 643 N.W.2d 132, 'll'll 42--43.
259. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll 23, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 'll 23, 683 N.W.2d 46,
'1! 23.
260. Sinclair v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 77 Wis. 2d 322, 335, 253 N.W.2d 245, 251
(1977) .
261. Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 'll 34, 267 Wis. 2d 59,
'l! 34, 671 N.W.2d 633, 'II 34.
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satisfied. 262 Wisconsin law requires a showing that the defendant either
acted maliciously or in intentional disregard of the rights of the injured
party. 263 Thus, the DTPA statutory claim is tantamount to a tort claim,
not a contract claim.
The elements for a common law fraud in the inducement claim in
Wisconsin are: (1) the defendant makes a factual representation; (2) the
representation is untrue; (3) the defendant knowingly or recklessly
made the untrue representation; (4) the representation is made with the
intent to defraud; (5) the aggrieved party reasonably relies on the
representation; and (6) the representation occurred before the contract
was formed. 264 The elements of a statutory claim for fraudulent
inducement under the DTPA require that (1) the representation occurs
before the contract is formed; (2) the representation must be untrue,
deceptive, or misleading; and (3) the representation must be to the
265
public. Some courts have also suggested that the aggrieved party must
reasonably rely on the representation as well. 266
A simple comparison suggests that the two differences between the
DTPA statutory claim of fraudulent inducement and a common law
claim are the requirements of the intent element in the common law
claim and the representation to the "public" in the statutory claim. Case
law decided under the DTPA is clear that a representation between two
contracting parties prior to contracting satisfies the statutory public
267
requirement.
Thus, no difference exists between the statutory and
common law claims on the statutory public requirement. The only
significant difference between the two claims is that the common law

:

.
262. Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 548-49, 472 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Ct.
App. 1991); H ines v. Camosy, No. 88-2247, 1989 WL 142779, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
1989).
263. WIS. STAT. § 895.043(3) (2005- 2006) .
264. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '][ 12, 283 Wis. 2d 555,
'][ 12, 699 N.W.2d 205, '][ 12.
265. WIS. STAT. §100.18 (2005-2006) (fraudulent representations).
266. Novell v. Migliaccio, No. 2005AP2852, 2006 WL 2947041, at *3, (Wis. Ct. App. Oct.
17, 2006); Below v. Norton, No. 2005AP2855, 2006 Wise. App. LEXIS 1092, at *8 (Nov. 21,
2006) .
267. Sta te v. A utoma tic Merchandisers of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659 66J-65, 221 N.W.2d
683, 686 (1974); Kail in v. Armstrong, 2002 WI A pp 70, ~ 44, 252 Wis. 2d 676, <J[ 44, 643
.W.2d 132, t 44; K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2006 WI App 148
'l[ 23, 720 N.W.2d 507, ~ 23. But see D & B A uto. Equip., Inc. v. Snap-On. Jnc., o. 03-CV141 , 2006 U .. D ist. LEXIS 17329, at *17, *21 (E.D. Wi . Mar. 27, 2006); Donisi v. McGann,
o. 2005AP1748-Ff 2005 WL 3116170, at ~u (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005); Mayville D ie &
Tool, Jnc. v. Weller Mach. Co., No. OJ -1509-FT, 2001 WL 1512917, 1 3 (Wi . Ct. A pp. Nov.
29, 2001).
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claim has an intent element that must be satisfied. The statutory claim
does not require proof of any intent to make a false representation, and
thus is intent-neutral. 268 Since all of the elements for the statutory and
common law claims of fraudulent inducement are the same, with only
the one exception, the statutory claim will be easier to prove than the
common law claim. Further, the statutory claim covers contracts that
relate to real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, service, or
"anything offered to the public for sale, hire, use, or lease. " 269 The scope
of the statutory claim of fraudulent inducement is much broader than
the narrower scope of the economic loss doctrine which applies only to
contracts for "products." Thus, one can fairly conclude that the DTPA
statutory claim for fraudulent inducement renders the economic loss
doctrine, and its appendant issue of whether the fraud is interwoven or
extraneous, a moot question. In sum, the DTPA renders the narrow
exception meaningless as a matter of implicit preemption by the
DTPA's statutory authorization or moot because of the broader scope
of the DTPA.

C. The Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Regulations
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss
doctrine conflicts with the regulations promulgated by the DATCP and
its authorizing statutes. The Wisconsin legislature granted the DATCP
the authority to promulgate regulations to implement chapters 93-100 of
the Wisconsin Statutes. 270 The regulations promulgated by the DATCP
have the force of law. 271 In addition, section 100.20 of the Wisconsin
Statutes grants the DATCP the authority to promulgate regulations that
forbid unfair methods of competition or trade practices. 272 The DATCP
has promulgated a series of rules that have a diverse scope. In large
part, the regulations specify and prohibit a number of unfair trade
practices that fraudulently induce contracts. The specific statutory areas
prohibiting fraudulently induced contracts are: home improvement
•
273
b asement waterproo f'mg practices;
.
274
practices;
rea1 estate

766,

268. Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 184,
<J[ 28.
269. WIS. STAT.§ 100.18(1) (2005-2006) (emphasis added).
270. !d. § 93.07(1) (department duties).
271. !d.
272. !d. § 100.20(2) (methods of competition and trade practices).
273. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 110.02 (2004).
274. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 111.03 (2006).

<J[

28, 722 N.W.2d
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advertising; 275 art prints and multiple art sales practices; 276 chain
distribution schemes; 277 telecommunications and cable television
services; 278 mobile home parks; 279 direct marketing; 280 coupon sales
282
promotions; 281 and motor vehicle repair.
Some of the prohibitions
283
apply to only consumer contracts,
and others have application to
commercial and consumer contracts. 284
The DATCP regulation with the broadest application to the
economic loss doctrine is DATCP section 127, which regulates direct
marketing. The direct marketing regulation applies to consumer
transactions in goods and services. 285 DATCP section 127 provides that
no seller may "[m]isrepresent the nature, quantity, material
characteristics, performance or efficacy of the goods or services offered
or promoted by a seller." 286 Unquestionably, the direct marketing
regulations apply to the sale of a product, and upon the occurrence of an
economic loss, the economic loss doctrine will apply. More particularly,
if the sale is fraudulently induced, the narrow exception provides that
for interwoven terms, the aggrieved party's remedy is solely breach of
contract. The regulations provide that a violation occurs if a seller
"[m]isrepresent[s] the nature, quantity, material characteristics,
performance or efficacy of the goods." 287 Clearly, the regulations
prohibit a seller from fraudulently inducing a contract by
misrepresenting any terms, including interwoven terms.
The authorizing statute also provides that any violation of the
DATCP's regulations permits the aggrieved party to sue for damages
and recover twice the amount of the pecuniary loss, together with costs
and attorney's fee. 288 There are a number of purposes served by the
statutory remedies. "First, the recovery of double damages and attorney
275 .
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
(2006).
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 114.02 (2004).
Id. § 117.10.
Id. § 122.01.
Id. § 123.10.
Id. § 125.09.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 127.14, 127.44, 127.72 (2006).
WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 131.07 (2006).
WIS. ADMIN. CODE A TCP § 132.09 (2004).
WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 110.01(1), 111.01, 123.01(13) , 125.01(1), 127.01(2)

Id. chs. 114,117,122,131,132.
Id. §§ 127.14(5), 127.44(5), 127.72(5).
Id. § 127.14(5).
Id.
WIS. STAT.§ 100.20(5) (2005-2006).
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fees encourages [aggrieved parties] to bring legal actions to enforce their
rights under the admini trative regulations." 289 Second, the aggrieved
parties who sue act as "private attorney[ s] general" who not only
enforce their indiv.idual rights but the aggregate of the individual suits
enforces the public's right .290 Third, the aggrieved-party suits that
subject violators to double damages have the effect of deterring
unacceptable c nduct. And finally, the private attorney general suits
'provide a necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers." 291
A recent case illustrates the correct relationship between the
DATCP regulations and the economic loss doctrine's directive to limit
an aggrieved party to his or her contract remedies. In Stuart v.
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 292 homeowners were fraudulently
induced to enter into an architectural and remodeling contract in
violation of DATCP section 110. The homeowners sued and sought
damages under section 100.20(5). The court concluded that the
economic loss doctrine was not applicable because the contracts were
Nevertheless, the court analyzed the
primarily for services. 293
relationship between the economic loss doctrine and the DATCP code
violations.
The court noted that the claims arising from the
administrative code violations are tort-based, not contract-based.
Further, the court reasoned that the statutory cause of action for
fraudulent inducement is "separate and apart from any breach of
contract" action. 294 The court noted that there is no indication that the
legislature, by passing the authorizing legislation, 'intended lo imply
add a remedy to common law misrepresentation claims or breach of
contract claims." 295 The court concluded by stating that to apply the
economic loss doctrine to a proven DATCP violation would defeat the

289. Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 340 N.W.2d 506, 509 (1983).
290. !d. at 358, 340 N.W.2d at 509.
291. !d.
292. 2006 WI App 109, '![ 17, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 17, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 17; see also
Carlson v. Gleichsner, No. 04-1376, 2005 WL 241168, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2005)
(noting that the economic Joss doctrine would not be a bar to a violation of Wisconsin
Administrative Code of Transportation section 139.03(1)). Section 139.03 prohibits the use of
false, deceptive, or misleading representation to induce the purchase of a motor vehicle. WIS.
ADMIN. CODE TRANS.§ 139.03(1) (2004).
293. Stuart, 2006 WI App 109, ~I 28,293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 28, 721 N.W.2d 127, ~128; see also
Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 184, 296 Wis. 2d 249, 722 N.W.2d
766.
294. Stuart, 2006 WI App 109, 'l[ 26, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 26, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 26.
295. !d. 'l[ 33,293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 33,721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 33.
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public purpose underlying section 100.20. 296 "[R]emedial statutes should
be liberally construed to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy
that the statute intended to afford." 297
In addition to authorizing a statutory cause of action for falsely
inducing contracts in violation of DATCP regulations, the statute also
298
authorizes double damages and the recovery of attorney's fees.
Courts have also permitted a plaintiff to elect punitive damages in lieu
of the statutorily authorized double damages. 299 Thus, an aggrieved
party who has been falsely induced to enter into a contract in violation
of the DATCP regulations has a statutory right to sue to recover his
pecuniary loss, plus attorney's fees, and if the circumstances merit,
punitive damages. These rights are in direct derogation to the economic
loss doctrine, which restricts an aggrieved party to only the contract
remedy. Further, the narrow exception would only permit a tort cause
of action if the false material related to an extraneous contact matter.
No such restriction is imposed under the statutory cause of action for a
violation of DATCP regulations. Thus, the statutory cause of action
pursuant to the authorizing statute and DATCP regulations supersedes
the economic loss doctrine and the narrow exception.

D. Statutory and Regulatory Summary
The narrow exception is in direct conflict with a number of
Wisconsin statutes and regulations that were enacted to redress
fraudulently induced contracts. An aggrieved party has a statutorily
authorized civil cause of action against a tortfeasor who has criminally
and fraudulently induced him or her to transfer his or her property to
another. The statute authorizes the aggrieved party to recover any
economic losses, costs, and punitive damages. 300 The legislature's
approach is a tort approach to redress fraudulently induced contracts,
not a contract approach. The focus is on the tortfeasor's conduct, not
the buyer's contract negotiating acumen. No duty is placed on the buyer
to assume, allocate, or ensure against the fraud in the contract. The
narrow exception, which bars a tort action for interwoven fraud, directly
conflicts with the statutorily authorized civil cause of action.
296. !d. 'l[34, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[34, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[34.
297. Benkoski v. Flood, 2001 WI App 84, 'll 8, 242 Wis .. 2d 652, 'll 8, 626 N.W.2d 851, 'l[8.
298. WIS. STAT.§ 100.20(5) (2005-2006).
299. See, e.g., Seay v. Gardner, No. 94-1933-Ff, 1995 WL 556273, at *2-*3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Sept. 21, 1995); Zablocki v. Hoefs, 128 Wis. 2d 560, 384 N.W.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1986)
(unpublished).
300. See WIS. STAT.§ 895.446(3) (2005-2006).
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The Wisconsin DTP A regulate: ma1·keting and trade practices. One
particularly broad provi ion f the DTPA pr hibits fraudulently
inducing a contract for the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real
1
estate merchandise securities, employment service, or anything else: ''' '
Any violation of the DTPA create a cause of action Lhat permits a
buyer to recover any conomic loss co ts, attorney's fees and punitive
damages.:m2 The DTPA approach to fraudulently induced contracts is a
tort approach, not a contract approach. No duty is placed on the buyer
to assume, all. cate, or insure against fraud. The DTPA's focus is on the
tortfeasor' misconduct, not the buyer's n g tiating ability. The narrow
exception, which bars any tort acti n for interwoven fraud clearly
conflicts with the DTPA. As such , tbe narrow exception is likely
rendered moot as a matter of implicit preemption by the DTPA' broad
coverage and statutorily authorized ca use of action.
Finally the Wisconsin DATCP has promulgated regulation that
forbid various unfair trade practices including fraudulently inducing a
consumer to enter into a contract fOT goods and servic . An aggrieved
consumer is authorized by statute to sue for any violation of DATCP
regulations. ~ The aggrieved consumer is statutorily authorized to
recover twice hi p cunia:ry loss, c sts, and attorneys fee . Punitive
damages can also be elected in lieu of the d uble damages. 304 The
tatutory approach for fraud ulently inducing a consumer contract in
violation of DATCP regulations i a t rt approach, not a contract
approach. No dut)' is placed on the buyer to as ume, aU cate or insure
against fraud . The DATCP regulations' focus is on the t rtfeasor's
misconduct which · the source of the problem. Again, tl1e narrow
exception which bar any tort action for interwoven fraud clearly
conflicts with the authorized tort r medy for fTaudulently inducing
contracts in violation of DATCP regulations.
111

X. CONCLUSION

The narrow fraud in the inducement exception o the economic Joss
doctrine is not a ound principle. It conflicts with establi heel precedent
under contract and tort law and conflicts with Wisconsin statutes and
regulations. For example, established c ntract principles dealing with
fraud under the parol evidence rule and as is clause have always
301.
302.
303.
304.

See id. § 100.18(1).
See id. § 100.20(5).
See id.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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permitted a tort action for any type of fraud. Further, contract clauses
that exculpate one for his or her intentional torts are against public
policy and not enforceable. Similarly, the narrow exception's tort bar
for interwoven fraud is against public policy. Tort principles are also
adversely affected by the adoption of the narrow exception. The torts of
promissory fraud and fraud in the factum/execution are eliminated by
barring tort actions for interwoven fraud. Unlike other torts committed
in the context of a contractual setting that are deemed independent torts
separate and apart from the contract, interwoven fraud is not considered
an independent tort. Under tort law, duress and fraud are considered to
be the same specie of tort. They both wrongfully induce the formation
of a contract. The narrow exception, however, treats them differently
by creating a tort exception for interwoven fraud. The narrow exception
also requires different treatment for virtually identical torts. A bailee
who exceeds the authorized use for bailed property commits a breach of
contract and the tort of conversion. The tort is actionable. One who
commits fraud in the inducement commits a breach of contract and the
tort of intentional misrepresentation. The tort is not actionable for
interwoven fraud.
Punitive damages cannot be assessed when
interwoven fraud is involved because the sole remedy is contract law.
The tortfeasor's deceitful conduct goes unpunished, and no message or
the wrong message is sent to others who may be watching. Also, the
public duty to be honest in contractual dealings is not promoted by the
narrow exception, since only contract remedies are available for
interwoven fraud. Finally, the narrow exception conflicts with the
various statutory causes of action authorized by Wisconsin Statutes,
including the Wisconsin DTPA, and it conflicts with DATCP
regulations. The statutory and regulatory approach to redressing
fraudulently induced contracts is a tort approach. Both focus on the
tortfeasor, not the victim. The burden is placed on the tortfeasor and
others similarly situated not to commit fraudulent conduct. For many
reasons, the narrow fraud in the inducement exception is simply not the
correct exception needed for fraud.
The broad exception is clearly the better exception. It correctly
redresses all deceitful conduct and treats it as tortious behavior. The
broad exception avoids all the conflicts with tort and contract law.
Finally, the broad exception follows the tort approach as adopted by the
Wisconsin statutes and regulations in redressing fraudulently induced
contracts.
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